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EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

ANTIOCHUS

We had fed the heart on fantasies,
The heart's grown brutal from the fare.

W. B. YEATS: *Meditations in Time of Civil War*

It is the common fashion today to denounce the imperialism of Western powers in Asia and Africa. Charges of economic exploitation are made and the tyranny and arrogance of the European are arraigned. Yet it is a simple and obvious fact that these areas which are said to suffer from imperialism today have known nothing but alien rule throughout most of their history and that, until the coming of the Western powers, their experience of government was the insolence and greed of unchecked arbitrary rule. It is not on these grounds, therefore, that the appearance of the West in Asia and Africa is to be deplored. A curse the West has indeed brought to the East, but — and here lies the tragedy — not intentionally; indeed the curse was considered — and still is by many — a precious boon, the most precious that the West could confer on the East in expiation of its supposed sins; and the curse itself is as potent in its maleficence in the West as it is in the East. A rash, a malady, an infection spreading from Western Europe and America through the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, India, the Far East and Africa, eating up the fabric of settled society to leave it weakened and defenceless before ignorant and unscrupulous adventurers, for further horror and atrocity: such are the terms to describe what the West has done to the rest of the world — not wilfully, not knowingly, but mostly out of excellent intentions and by the example of its prestige and prosperity. At the stage where we are it becomes possible to follow, in certain cases, the course of the malady, to trace the first treacherous symptoms and link them through a long agony to the last spasm of resistance, to recount the complications, the attempted remedies and to record the final irrevocable relapses. And of the decomposing matter that is left what shall we say? That those who are sanguine enough may hope that out of it, one day, the tissue of a living society will, once more, grow.

1

Of these cases the purest, perhaps the most classical, are to be found in the communities which not so long ago constituted the Ottoman Empire. And the most pitiful among them is perhaps that of the Armenian community. The Armenians are a very ancient

people whose history, owing to their geographical position, has at all times been grim and difficult; the history of a small group bruised and crushed in the eternal rivalry and contention of powerful empires. With the advent of the Ottoman supremacy the Armenian community, like the other religious groups in the Ottoman territory, was established with a certain measure of internal self-government, and its members took their place in the delicate balance of Ottoman society. Such was still the situation at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the West suddenly impinged on the Ottoman dominions and set the Armenians and the other elements of this Eastern society new problems and dangled before them new temptations, with which their secular experience had hardly taught them how to deal. It is to be observed that these problems and temptations were, at the outset, not political, and that the challenge would not have been so serious had they been merely political. For with politics the Armenians were well acquainted, and how to protect themselves in the clash of great powers was something not alien to their tradition. The problem and the temptation was not that of Western political ambitions but that of Western learning.

The religion of the Armenians was their distinctive badge in an Ottoman society regulated and governed according to denominational distinctions. This religion was not a matter for the individual conscience, for personal and private devotions; it was a rule of life regulating all social activities and all relations with the suzerain power, itself suzerain by virtue of professing the dominant religion. And the internal government of the community was similarly the prerogative of the religious hierarchy, which drew its civil power from the fact of its ecclesiastical authority.

Into these long-standing and well understood arrangements the West, round about 1830, suddenly intruded. It came in the shape of American Protestant missionaries. They arrived with arguments and tracts and funds. Their purpose, they said, was to infuse vitality and spirit into the unprogressive and dormant Eastern Christian communities. They proceeded to make converts and to propagate their tenets by founding schools on the Lancastrian system. The established hierarchy resisted these encroachments. It exiled and imprisoned Armenian converts to Protestantism. It approached the Ottoman Government with a request to forbid the activities of these missionaries. In 1839, Hagopos, the Patriarch adjunct, issued a bull forbidding the reading of all books printed or circulated by them.¹ The objections of the hierarchy to missionary activity were deep-seated and violent, but they were not very articulate. Dwight, the chronicler of the missionaries, gives an indication of these objections: 'The words *Framasón* (Freemason),' he says, '*Lutrán* (Lutheran),

¹ H. G. O. DWIGHT: *Christianity in Turkey* (1854), p. 93.

Voltér (Voltaire) and Protestàn (Protestant) were freely and indiscriminately applied to us, all of them being considered by the common people as synonyms, and the meaning being rather indefinite, but yet implying an atheist of the most wicked and dangerous description.¹ Horatio Southgate, an American Episcopalian Bishop and a traveller in the East, shared, it seemed, these prejudices; in an English religious periodical he described the converts as 'infidels and radicals'.² And nearly half a century later, at the beginning of the Armenian troubles, the Ottoman Government also gave expression to the same prejudice. In 1894, it issued instructions affecting the free attendance of Armenian children at American schools. 'As far as I have been able to learn,' writes Consul Cumberbatch from Angora to Sir Philip Currie at Constantinople, on October 5th, 1894, 'these new measures are to the effect that Armenian parents must become sureties for their children's conduct as loyal subjects both during and after their attendance at American schools.'³ What actually were the doctrines that the missionaries, arousing so much opposition and anger from so many different quarters, were teaching? Dwight defines them for us: 'The standard doctrine of the Reformation — salvation by grace alone, without the deeds of the law — was usually the great central truth, first apprehended by their awakened and inquiring minds, and made the ground of satisfactory repose.'⁴ The 'standard doctrine of the Reformation' had meant in Europe, its native breeding ground, a great and prolonged upheaval. And it would be surprising if its sudden introduction into a society totally unprepared for it were not to result in even greater upheavals and in dislocations even more fundamental.

Salvation by grace alone, without the deeds of the law: the implications of the doctrine are as exhilarating as they are dangerous. As a principle governing the religious life, its application is limited and its practice exacting. It cannot, obviously, afford guidance to the majority of those who profess any creed; it demands a severe mystical discipline of which only a few, after long preparation, are capable. Even then, the pitfalls are so numerous and so subtle that there is a mere hair's breadth, on this particular path, between salvation and damnation. It seems then inevitable that the general introduction of such a doctrine into a society should act as a solvent of the secular restraints which more pedestrian rules had enjoined. This, if only because the doctrine presupposes the independence of individual judgment and primacy of individual will. Nor is this the end of the matter. The individual is set free, and his judgment is declared, under God, supreme. Suppose then the individual to take a further step and to affirm that he is indeed free and that his judg-

¹ Op. cit., p. 112.

² Turkey (no. 6), Cmd. 8108 (1896).

³ Op. cit., p. 244.

⁴ DWIGHT, p. 110.

ment is, without any qualification, supreme. The inevitable happens: Secularism and Protestantism merge into one another; and the doctrine of salvation by grace, which was a means of attaining the Life Eternal, becomes an alluring instrument for the building of Heaven on Earth: Nationalism is begotten. Thus a later American missionary, in his horror at the Armenian massacres of 1895 and at the responsibility of Armenians for them, tries to explain the situation to himself by ascribing the disaster to those Armenians who 'having imbibed the free thought ideas developed in the French Revolution, and fired by the experience of 1848, were utterly impatient of the slower process of education'.¹ He is right, but he does not consider that there is a path which *may* lead from salvation by grace to 'the free thought ideas developed in the French Revolution'.

The introduction of these ideas, then, could not fail to affect the internal affairs of the Armenian community, as well as its relations with the Ottoman power. To start with, a schism, encouraged by the missionaries,² took place between the Orthodox majority and the converts to Protestantism, and a new Protestant Armenian community was formed. Then, within the Orthodox community itself, parties of 'Enlightened' and 'Reactionaries' were formed. After a while, the 'Enlightened', as is proper, won and reorganized the government of the Armenian community. Extensive powers were taken away from the ecclesiastical hierarchy and vested in a new elective Communal Council of Deputies. In 1860, the Ottoman Government, which was then looking on reforms in general with a benevolent eye, gave its approval.³ Such were the first reactions of the Armenians to the Western challenge. But, of course, things could not possibly remain where they were. If rebellion against the hierarchy was to be proclaimed, then, logically, rebellion against the master of the hierarchy, the Ottoman State, had also to be proclaimed. In 1872 an Armenian was writing in a new patriotic paper in Tiflis: 'Yesterday, we were an ecclesiastical community; tomorrow, we shall be a nation of workers and thinkers.'⁴

How then should the Armenians become a nation? Till now, what distinguished them from others were a religion and a language; they had no cohesion, no sense of national unity and they were geographically scattered. There were important groups of them in Eastern Anatolia, in Cilicia and in the Russian Caucasus. These were the principal groups, but there were others, not negligible, scattered across the length and breadth of the Ottoman Empire. Nowhere were

¹ E. M. BLISS: *Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities* (1896), p. 335.

² DWIGHT, pp. 148-9.

³ F. MACLER: *Autour de l'Arménie* (Paris, 1917), pp. 68-72.

⁴ A. O. SARKISSIAN: *History of the Armenian Question to 1885* (Urbana, 1938), p. 137.

they in a decisive majority; the Kurds, in Anatolia, notably, were an important and uncontrollable element of the population. More important still, the Armenian community was intimately intertwined with the other elements of Ottoman society. And in any case, they had no classes accustomed to the exercise and responsibility of power, and the general population was not likely, in any foreseeable future, to become a body of independent and knowledgeable citizenry, which is the first requisite in a 'nation'. Such were the internal difficulties. There were external ones, no less formidable. Was, for instance, the Ottoman State to acquiesce in another amputation of its dominion? And if, *per impossibile*, it did acquiesce, what would Russia have to say to a small irredentist nation on a sensitive and difficult border area? And if Russia favoured the Armenians, would not this make the resistance of the Ottomans even more implacable? And what would be the attitude of the other Great Powers to this further complication in the Eastern question?¹ But this was to talk sweet reasonableness to men exalted with the promise of salvation. And those among the Armenians who ventured to speak this language were murdered for their pains.

The thing, then, was to act. The obvious plan was to get, first of all, the support of a Great Power, like all the other nationalities which had seceded from the Ottoman State. Here, the alternative would have to lie between Great Britain and Russia. Great Britain was then unlikely to encourage projects tending to the disruption of the Ottoman Empire. There remained Russia with whom the Armenians had many connections, and who ruled over an important section of them in the Caucasus. Russia might be prepared to listen and to extend a benevolent support to the Armenian cause in the interest of her own Turkish policy; but Russia, on the other hand, would always have reasons to discourage an Armenian National Movement, and presumably the Armenian leaders reasoned that they would cross this bridge when they came to it.² The opportunity soon came in the crisis of 1877. The victorious Russians at the gates of Constantinople were dictating the peace of San Stefano. The Armenians, with the consent of the Turks it seems,³ approached the Russians to ask their

¹ There is an excellent account of the diplomacy of the Armenian question in W. L. LANGER: *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (New York, 1951), pp. 145-66, 195-212 and 321-50.

² They could not cross it; witness the fate of the Armenian Republic in 1920.

³ '... when the Russians approached Constantinople in 1877, they [the Turks] were taking refuge in Christian and foreign houses, and imagining that the Russians would retain the Eastern Anatolian provinces, prompted the Armenians to suggest to the Russians a scheme of administrative autonomy under the guarantee of a Russian occupation'. Memorandum by G. H. Fitzmaurice in GOOCH and TEMPERLEY: *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, vol. X, part I, pp. 511-512.

support for a scheme of an autonomous Armenia under a Christian governor. But at the Congress of Berlin 'autonomy' was whittled down to 'reforms and improvements' which the Great Powers, and especially Great Britain, pledged themselves to see accomplished. From that date, autonomy became an obsession with the Armenian leaders. It constituted at once the maximum and the minimum of their demands. The minimum: since it was doubtless argued that once autonomy under a Christian governor was gained, the rest would come easily, as they had only to look at Rumania and Bulgaria to realize; the maximum: since they argued that 'they would get in proportion as they asked; hence they asked for the greatest that could be given with the expectation . . . of securing not that but something less which should be, after all, a great advance . . .'¹ Thirty-five years later, in 1913, after the massacres and the disasters and the setbacks, under a more centralizing and even more intransigent Young Turk government, they were still asking for autonomy. In September 1913, the Armenian community addressed a circular to the Powers in this sense, but when the French Ambassador asked what the Armenians really expected, he was told that it was for the Powers to see whether the desires of the Armenians could be satisfied.² It was an artless, a pitiful policy since neither the Ottomans were prepared to accord autonomy, nor would the Russians really favour it; the Russians were always ready to use the Armenian agitation as a convenient pretext to achieve their end, which was to annex the Armenian provinces. Twice, Great Britain proposed to Russia to take drastic measures to solve the Armenian question, once in 1895 and again in 1913, and on both occasions the Russians first equivocated, and then refused: with the Armenian question the Russians would deal strictly on their own terms.³ With neither the Russians nor the Ottomans willing, what chance did autonomy stand? As Salisbury told Canon MacColl, a turbulent leader of the Armenian agitation in this country, in 1896: 'You might turn this government out, and ten other governments after it, but you would not be able to accomplish a result which Austria, Russia, Germany, France and Turkey are determined to prevent.'⁴ This persistent and obstinate pursuit of a fantasy is an indication of how little the Armenians were ready to deal with the world as they found it — and the world broke them.

There remained the 'reforms and improvements'. The aim of

¹ BLISS, p. 334.

² *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 3ème Série, Tome VIII, p. 151.

³ For Russian discouragement of Armenian Nationalism in the Caucasus see: H. F. B. LYNCH: *Armenia* (1901); Sir CHARLES ELIOT: *Turkey in Europe* (1908), pp. 398-9; and Lord WARKWORTH: *Notes from a diary in Asiatic Turkey* (1898), pp. 99ff.

⁴ G. W. E. RUSSELL: *Malcolm MacColl* (1914), p. 153.

these in the Armenian provinces, as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, was twofold: to procure security for the subject by protecting him from arbitrary impositions, and to create a machinery whereby the business of government could be efficiently and expeditiously dispatched. For these aims to be attained or even approximated, two conditions were essential. These were indicated by Sir Edward Grey, in 1913, after nearly a century of experiments in 'reform' with which Great Britain had been intimately associated. 'As to reform,' he wrote to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 'Your Excellency should impress upon Mr Sazonow that two conditions are essential to success

1. Unanimity amongst the Powers

2. Acceptance of their scheme by Turkey, without coercion.'¹

From the circumstances of the case, the first condition could never be attained. Till the emergence of the German Empire on the European scene, Great Britain and Russia could never reach agreement on the Eastern question. Germany only made the situation infinitely more complicated.

As to the second condition, some Ottomans had at times, it is true, been themselves zealous exponents of reform. But there were always many who objected to it, not, it would seem, from obscurantism, but from a correct understanding of the nature of the Ottoman State and of the sources of Ottoman power. The Ottoman State was a vast conglomeration of groups held together by the might and prestige of the house of Uthman; the Ottoman State and the Ottoman House were bound up each with the other. This, the Ottomans understood very well. They also understood another thing: that Ottoman power meant Muslim supremacy. It was that 'domineering Mahometan sentiment, which has determined the relations of Islam and non-Islam in daily life' of which Gladstone speaks,² which gave strength and loyalty to those on whom the security of the Ottoman State depended. The realization of this was very vivid in Europe till this century when it seems to have been strangely forgotten. Now, since reforms would do away both with the personal power of the Ottoman rulers and with Muslim supremacy, the Ottomans could hardly be expected to acquiesce in this; hence the failure of reform. As Sir Charles Eliot makes his Pasha say: 'This country is a dish of soup, and no one has any real intention except to eat it. We eat it in the good old-fashioned way with a big spoon. You bore little holes in the bottom of the soup bowl and draw it off with pipes. Then you propose that the practice of eating soup with spoons should be abolished as uncivilized, because you know we have no gimlets and

¹ GOOCH and TEMPERLEY, vol. X, part I, p. 488

² In a letter to Mme Novikoff quoted in TEMPERLEY: 'British Policy in Turkey', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 1933, p. 185.

don't understand this trick of drinking through pipes.¹ There was also another reason for this failure. Before the advent of European powers, Ottoman administration was certainly corrupt and arbitrary, but it was ramshackle and inefficient and left many interstices by which the subject could hope to escape its terrors, and bribery was a traditional and recognized method of mitigating severities and easing difficulties.² The reforms sought to introduce European methods into this completely alien tradition. In the absence of the honesty and public spirit which make them tolerable in Europe, such novelties tend rather to make matters worse: they teach the corrupt and unscrupulous administrator new ways of extorting bribes and perquisites, they make it more difficult to escape from the eye of malevolent authority, and easier for adventurers and desperadoes to establish themselves securely in office. Railways, telegraphs, filing cabinets, etc., become instruments of a monstrous and inescapable control. In the case of the Armenians, for instance, the telegraph enabled Abdul Hamid to concert and supervise those outbreaks of savagery which were his remedy for the Armenian difficulty.³ In truth, it was well recognized by liberal opinion here in the nineteenth century — and it was liberal opinion which was convinced of the necessity of reforms in the East — that the only way to make reforms work was for a European government to administer them directly.⁴ The change from a belief in reforms supervised by Europe to one in national self-determination constitutes a significant moment in the degradation of liberal dogma.

'Reforms and Improvements' were, then, of little help and they were not wanted by the Ottomans. But neither were they wanted by those Armenians who now took hold of the Armenian community and imposed on it their leadership. Thus we find the leader of the

¹ ELIOT, p. 13.

² For a *rationale* of bribery as a method of government see ELIOT, pp. 137-8 and especially the witty introduction. See also CURZON, *Persia*, vol. I, pp. 438-448.

³ See LYNCH, vol. II, p. 84; and the comments of Vice-Consul Fitzmaurice at Urfa in 1896, Turkey (no. 3) Cmd. 8303 (1897), p. 102, on the use of the telegraph by the central Ottoman Government to keep the provincial Valis informed of Armenian incidents in the Empire to prevent the spread of harmful rumours: 'The motive appears at first sight a good one, but the result, as generally happens in Turkey, was and is disastrous. For the Porte, generally, either willingly or unwillingly misinformed, telegraphs the first garbled account, and this becoming known through the officials to the Mussulman population, tends to poison and excite the minds of the latter against the unsuspecting Christians, who are, in most cases, innocent of any treasonable intentions.'

⁴ This can be illustrated from a whole range of liberal writing and comment of all shades and colours on foreign affairs; see, for instance, *The Life and Letters of Jowett*, vol. II, p. 118; DUKE OF ARGYLL: *Our Responsibility for Turkey* (1896); MALCOLM MACCOLL: *The Sultan and the Powers* (1896); and an interesting quotation from J. D. BOURCHIER in *History of The Times*, vol. IV, part I, p. 75. This was, of course, the creed which sustained both Stratford, Canning and Cromer.

Hintchak Revolutionary Party rejecting the idea of reforms: 'This plan of ours which can be summed up in the words "autonomous Armenia for the Armenians" . . . cannot be considered extravagant. But there is a very wide gulf between this moderate practical plan of ours, which is that of the whole of Armenia, and the plan of reforms proposed in the collective notes of the Ambassadors, and to bridge that gulf over no means are left to the Armenians but insurrection, which would once again bring to the front the Armenian Question. . .'¹ And these leaders took care that Armenians would not be found to help with the reforms.²

No means but insurrection: this was clear and it was meant seriously. The leaders of the Armenian nationalist movement had already decided that autonomy was their goal and they thought they had a strategy to achieve it. For it was not in vain that they surveyed the history of Europe from the French Revolution, and not in vain that they meditated on the liberation of Greece, Serbia, Rumania and Bulgaria from the Ottoman yoke. They would make insurrection and they would bring the Armenian Question 'to the front'. Then the Powers would have to deal with it, and if they failed to deal with it according to the desires of the nationalists, why, there were always means of keeping the Armenian Question 'to the front'.

It might seem, however, that the decision to resort to rebellion came with the failure of reforms. But this is not so. As early as 1882, four years after the Congress of Berlin, action committees were being formed by the Armenians in Erzerum and arms were being procured.³ Secret societies were set up in Russia, England, France and Switzerland and agents were sent to the Armenian populations in Turkey. Little by little the agitation began to bear fruit. The Ottoman authorities took alarm and began to persecute and the vicious circle was created that was to lead, at last, to the extermination and dispersal of the Armenian communities of Turkey. Thus, in 1889, Colonel Chermside reports from Trebizon: 'The petty, harassing persecutions of Armenians in the Van district is a matter of regret. I consider the Armenian populations in those districts restless and disaffected . . .'⁴ In 1893, a few years before the massacres were to be unleashed by Abdul Hamid, Vice-Consul Newton writes from Angora: 'Last autumn the movement in a modified form extended to this province, first showing itself in the district of Caesarea and afterwards at Yuzgat, by meetings held by the Armen-

¹ A. NAZARBEK: *The Voice of the Armenian Revolutionaries etc.* (1895), p. 11.

² See, for instance, the case of the Armenian notable in Erzerum who was dissuaded 'by advice not unmixed with menace' from serving on a reform commission set up by the Turks. *British Parliamentary Papers*, vol. XCV, 1896, p. 283.

³ MACLER, p. 140.

⁴ Turkey (no. 1) Cmd. 5723, (1889) p. 71.

ians in the gardens and fields outside the towns. Finding the authorities did not appear to take any notice, they began to hold meetings in their houses, in the towns, which excited the suspicions of the Government. Consequently spies were set to watch them, and sufficient evidence was thus procured showing a revolutionary feeling, which evidently justified the authority in arresting many of those who attended these meetings.¹

The aim of the nationalists is clear. It was to create 'incidents', provoke the Turks to excesses, and thereby bring about the intervention of the Powers. The British Blue Books of the period before the massacres are full of reports of attacks by Armenian agents or bands on Turks and Kurds, of the distribution of seditious prints, of the discoveries by Ottoman authorities of caches of bombs and arms, of demonstrations organized by Armenians in Constantinople and the provinces. In most cases, the incidents would have no immediate far-reaching consequences, but some of them, either owing to circumstances or to the ill-will of Ottoman officials, led to serious results. In Sasun in 1894, in Zeitun in 1895, the incidents led to armed risings by the Armenians of these localities which were, of course, bloodily suppressed. An outcry was the result, consular commissions were appointed to investigate, and the Armenian leaders had the consolation of knowing that another blow had been struck in the cause of Armenian independence.

The Blue Books also record another class of incident, quite as large as the first, created by the nationalists, but these much more sinister. It seems that the nationalists had to convince not only the Ottoman Government and the Powers of the wisdom of satisfying their desires, they had to convince the generality of the Armenian people as well. This must be the explanation of the attack organized by them on the Patriarch as he was officiating in the Cathedral of Koum Kapou at Constantinople in July 1890, as a result of which he had to resign his office;² of a subsequent attempt to assassinate another Patriarch in 1894;³ of the recurrent reports of Armenians executed for being 'informers', for refusing to contribute to nationalist funds, for 'collaborating' with the Turkish Government. Nor did the nationalists try to hide or excuse these activities. Here is a passage from a revolutionary placard posted in Sivas in December 1893: 'Osmanlis! . . . The examples are before your eyes. How many hundreds of rascals in Constantinople, Van, Erzerum, Alashkert, Harpout, Cesarea, Marsovan, Amassia and other towns have been killed by the Armenian revolutionists? What were these rascals? Armenians! Armenians! and again Armenians! If our aim was

¹ Turkey (no. 3), Cmd. 8015 (1896), p. 99.

² *British Parliamentary Papers*, vol. XCVI, 1890-91, p. 523.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. XCVI, 1896, p. 99.

against the Mohamedans or Mahomedanism, as the Government tries to make you think, why should we kill the Armenians?"¹ The Armenians were being forced to be free.

What did the Ottoman Government have to say to all this? Its attitude was as clear as that of the nationalists: this agitation could have only one result, to invite Europe to meddle again in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. This was not to be tolerated; the Armenians had to desist or they would take the consequences. It is worth while to reproduce an address made by the Mutessarif of Amassia in 1893 to Armenians in his district, which expresses eloquently and concisely the Ottoman view of the situation: 'You are hoping to get help from Europeans,' he told them, 'and you kneel down before them. You do not remark that they are playing a joke on your backs. Europeans have been trying for a long time to destroy the Turkish Empire, and they put you forward now to create new troubles. If even their plans would succeed would you be any better off than now? You pay little tax; you are free from military service; you keep your religion, your language and your customs. Would the Power coming in our place give you the same liberties? Look at Russia, where the Government has shut up all your schools and is now considering the question of shutting up your principal church at Etchmiadzin. Why do you send your children to the schools of the Europeans where their spirit is corrupted by new and foolish ideas?'²

So, if the Armenians needed a lesson, Abdul Hamid felt he was quite able to give them one. His policy was that amalgam of massive brutality and of primitive cunning which constitutes traditional Oriental statecraft. The Armenians wanted autonomy, did they? They created incidents? They threatened the intervention of the Powers? He would show them what his loyal Kurdish tribes would have to say to Armenian autonomy in *their* Kurdistan, and what a way they had of dealing with incidents. A massacre or two would show the Armenians what he meant.³ And as for the Powers, he

¹ Turkey (no. 6) Cmd. 8108 (1896), p. 14.

² Turkey (no. 3), Cmd. 8015 (1896), p. 196.

³ Massacres were very easy to organize. Sir Mark Sykes has described very well how the thing is done: '... it is the work of a mob acting under the following impulses:

'First degree: Hate Armenians; have been told the Armenians intend a revolution; have been told so by Armenians; have heard it hinted that the Government wish a massacre; rumour goes that the Armenians have concealed weapons; they desire to plunder; they desire to fight; they massacre.'

'Second degree: Say twenty-five per cent are loafing about; hear shots; cry of "Ho, ye Muslims!"; run to see what is the matter; strike for the faith; the Armenians have risen and they massacre.'

'Third degree: The remainder! Fire! Blood! Murder! Kill! They massacre.'

(*Dar-ul-Islam*, p. 126 n.)

could easily settle them. Did Russia propose intervention? He would whisper in her ear that England wanted a foothold on the Caucasus; did Lord Salisbury threaten action? He would threaten Lord Salisbury with placing the Ottoman Empire in the hands of Russia. Abdul Hamid's reaction then was straightforward and elementary. The Armenians were rebelling against their lord: punishment should be meted out to them. They wanted reforms and constitutions and such like Frankish abominations: they would not be permitted to indulge their perverse desires. And they threatened to diminish the Ottoman estate and to introduce into it the meddlesome foreigner: they would see retribution. As for the indignation of the Europeans and their outcries, all that was part of a hypocritical conspiracy to defraud him and the house of Uthman of another province. He would not give way, he would resist, he would massacre; let them do their worst, he would use terror and he would use guile, and he would fight for all he was worth. It was perhaps the last powerful manifestation of the pride of family and of religion as a motive of the policy of an empire. After that, the Ottomans became Young Turks.

The nationalists were checkmated but did not confess defeat. 'A l'organisation militaire de l'Empire Ottoman, nous opposons des bandes volantes et bien armées d'intrépides révolutionnaires qui ont infligé maintes pertes aux troupes régulières et aux hordes de "Bachibousouks" . . . aux délations judaïques de la police secrète nous opposons la terreur rouge . . .' Thus the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in 1896. And the incidents continued to be organized. In 1897, just after the massacres of 1895-96, in 1905, there are records of minor insurrections also leading to massacres.¹ Later, when the catastrophe was final, complete, irredeemable, the nationalists were still indignant that their methods had had such untoward consequences. They could not understand why salvation was so recalcitrant in coming, why the easy path which the example of so many European revolutions had promised should have proved full of vipers and of nettles. The desolate wind of futility blows through the report the Dashnaks presented to the International Socialist Congress in Hamburg in 1923. 'Every time that, through the irresistible force of things, the movement of Armenian emancipation expressed itself in revolutionary action, every time that the party of the Armenian Risorgimento tried, at the head of the conscious elements of the country, to draw the attention of the world, by armed insurrections or peaceful demonstrations, to the intolerable fate of the Armenian people, the Turkish Government threw the Armenian masses, peaceful and unarmed, to the mercy of its troops, its

¹ *British Parliamentary Papers*, vol. CVI, 1898, p. 274; W. A. and E. T. A. WIGRAM: *The Cradle of Mankind* (1922), pp. 247-75.

bachibazouks and of the Turkish and Kurdish mob.¹ There is a surprised air about the statement.

But the Hamidian massacres were not the end of the story. When the Young Turks deposed Abdul Hamid and took over, with the help of the Dashnaks, the government of the Ottoman Empire, these permitted themselves for a time to hope that their aspirations would be fulfilled. They soon found out that it was not to be so. The Young Turks were nationalists, just as the Armenian leaders were, and therefore much less prepared than even Abdul Hamid to concede autonomy — which was what the Armenians still wanted. According to Young Turk theory, the Armenians were not really Armenians, but Ottomans who happened to speak Armenian, and to profess the Christian religion; they were part of the Ottoman nation like their brothers the Muslims, the Greek Orthodox, the Kurds and the Macedonians. This absurdity could, of course, take in nobody for long, least of all the Armenian nationalists whose creed was that an Armenian nation existed on its own. Very well then, said the Young Turks, if they refuse to be part of the Ottoman nation, they shall be cut off from the body of that nation. It is to be observed that the Young Turk theory of persecution differs sensibly from the Hamidian theory.

Cut off the Armenians were. Just before the war of 1914 the Russians were again in contact with the nationalists, holding out hopes and stirring them up.² At the outbreak of the war the attitude of the Armenian nationalists in Turkey was ambiguous and the Young Turks must have been, from the start, suspicious. Then occurred the final folly which gave the Turks the pretext for the ultimate liquidation. In December 1914, an Armenian volunteer division, wearing Russian uniforms, invaded the plain of Passinlar, north of Erzerum. In 1915, the town of Van, predominantly Armenian, was seized by the population and a local Armenian government instituted.³ The Young Turks were ruthless and methodical. They besieged Van and reduced it. Then the deportations started. Everywhere the Armenians were assembled and sent off suddenly on foot, without notice, without any baggage, to perish from famine, cold, maltreatment and hard labour in the wilderness of Anatolia, the mountains of Cilicia and the deserts of Syria. A law was passed concerning 'the properties of persons who have been transported elsewhere' to regularize the distribution of Armenian goods to the populace and the soldiery. The largesse of the progres-

¹ L'Action du Parti S. R. Arménien dit Daschnaktzoutioun, 1914-23.

² GOOCH and TEMPERLEY, vol. X, part I, pp. 450, 470; F. VALYI: *Spiritual and Political Revolutions in Islam* (1925), pp. 205-36.

³ A. EMIN: *Turkey in the World War* (1928), pp. 218-19; R. NOGALES: *Four Years Beneath the Crescent* (1926).

sive Young Turks was as generous as that of any primitive Sultan. Then there was the short, miserable episode of the Republic of Armenia in 1919-20. That was the end. But is not Armenian autonomy now to be at last enjoyed in the benign shadow of Russia? And has not the labour of the reformers at last come to fruition in a Turkey the very image of Europe? And is not the ramshackle, tyrannous, inefficient, blasting and withering rule of the Ottomans destroyed for ever? Thus we may rejoice that all things in the end are well.

2

The Armenians had nearly a century to deal, as well as they could, with the disturbance introduced by the West in their midst. They failed utterly — but the struggle they waged was long and desperate. The Jews of Iraq did not have even this measure of luck. A bare thirty years sufficed to destroy their community and achieve their ruin, and the resistance they could offer was derisory and, from the start, ineffective. When the British troops occupied Baghdad in 1917, the Jews were perhaps the most important single element in the town — by their numbers, their wealth, their relations with those among them who had established themselves overseas (notably in Bombay and Manchester), and by their acknowledged superior position in the Mesopotamian economy. In November 1918, when it looked as though the Ottomans were finally repulsed, and that the British would remain in occupation, they decided to try to define their relation to the new rulers of the land; they were also moved by rumours and allegations — following the publication of an Anglo-French Declaration which promised 'to encourage and assist in the establishment of indigenous Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia' — that the country was to be given over to the 'Arabs' to rule. They petitioned the Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, and asked to be allowed to become British subjects. They said that they did not like the prospect of an indigenous government to rule over them, and gave three reasons in support of their position: the Arabs were politically irresponsible, they had no administrative experience, and they could be fanatical and intolerant. In 1919, they returned to the charge with another petition, and it is interesting to reproduce it, to show the pathetic caution with which they proceeded, and their anxiety to pay lip-service to the shibboleths of the age. They said: 'The proclaimed aim of the Great Allied Powers in the most tremendous world war is the complete liberation of oppressed nationalities with object of assuring their legitimate political aspirations as well as their economical and social development

'The full development of peoples whom several centuries of national lethargy plunged into a state of utter unpreparedness for

self-administration is only obtainable through the material and moral co-operation of a great European power. We are therefore of opinion:

'That the nomination of an Amir for Mesopotamia is inadmissible.

'That a direct British government is indispensable for the future administration of this country.'

The petition was not granted. It could not, by any conceivable means, have been granted in 1919. The Jews of Baghdad were defeated from the start; but they did not know it, and would not know it for a long time to come. The situation was completely beyond their understanding. For how could they have discerned the prodigious spectacle that then appeared, of deliquescent Liberals and *Tancred* Tories, banding together in London, to utilize the might and authority of a victorious empire, in order to bring about in the Middle East, consciously and willingly, such conditions as had hitherto been seen only with the decay of authority and the decline of empire? Power the Jews of Baghdad could understand certainly, and the coarse, capricious exercise of power. The right of conquest they could cheerfully acknowledge, for all their history had taught them that there lay safety. These things, and these things alone lay within their experience, and how pitifully inadequate they were going to prove! It was not by the help of this experience that they would understand the strange, exquisite perversions of the Western conscience; the genial eccentricity of Mr Philby, proposing to make a thug who took his fancy the President of an Iraqi Republic; or the fond foolishness of Miss Bell, thinking to stand godmother to a new Abbassid Empire; or the disoriented fanaticism of Colonel Lawrence, proclaiming that he would be dishonoured if the progeny of the Sharif of Mecca was not forthwith provided with thrones. Yet it was with such people that their fate rested.

So Faisal, the son of the Sharif, was brought from Mecca to govern his new kingdom of Iraq. The Jews decided on a last attempt. In 1921, they went to see Sir Percy Cox, the High Commissioner, and again asked for the privilege of becoming British subjects. 'They based their claim on the fact that their country had been conquered by British troops, and that they were actually at the moment Turkish subjects under British control; and that therefore the British had no moral right to force them to accept a change of nationality unless they so desired it. They were eventually appeased by the personal influence of the High Commissioner, and by his assurance that ample guarantees would be afforded them by the British Government against any form of local tyranny . . .'¹ There was plainly little prospect of anything but Faisal and his Iraqi Government. To this they would have to resign themselves.

Many who are experienced and wise, of whom perhaps the most

¹ R. COKE: *The Heart of the Middle East* (1925), p. 220.

eloquent was Sir Arnold Wilson, have expressed their misgivings over the policy of setting up ramshackle national sovereignties in the Middle East. But the most moving protest is that of a gentle English boy, earnest and upstanding and true, of those whom the genius of England knows so well how to nurture and rear. The fortunes of war had taken him to Mesopotamia, and he found himself in 1918, he who was nothing to Mesopotamia and to whom Mesopotamia was nothing, in charge of a district in the Middle Euphrates, where he was to be killed in the rising of 1920. Prior to that rising, the *Nation*, in common with most other papers in England, was waging a campaign in favour of self-determination. From the depth of the Mesopotamian countryside, he was moved to write to the Editor, his qualification being that, as he put it, 'a year ago he was writing college essays upon the Will of the People and Natural Law'. 'You, Sir, and your correspondents,' he told the Editor, 'want to see "national aspirations gratified", the recognition of the "unity of the Arab race", the establishment of responsible Arab government, and the absolute prevention of any further additions to the already overweighted British Empire. So do I, and it is just for this reason that I want you not to allow this slipshod thinking, and to make it clear, as it has never (to my knowledge) been made clear, that progress on such lines is a matter of extraordinary difficulty and that theory, alike with history, gives no help in solving a problem, which has never yet been attempted. The problem is, of course, how to provide a native government with the force required to govern a wild and very mixed race divided by the bitterest religious hostilities and tribal feuds, and containing in its midst also colonies of fiercely hated Jews and Christians. Once stated, the problem needs no enlargement from me: that you allow your correspondents to proceed airily in the assumption . . . that, if left alone, these people could govern themselves and freely employ European advisers, is almost Tolstoyan in its view of human nature.' He went on to make these points:

'(1) We are dealing with people who have lost all consciousness of nationality in the political sense, who have from time immemorial been governed by foreigners, and among whom indeed the very word "Arab" is used scornfully.

'(2) These people are utterly unvocal, like all uneducated masses, and it is impossible to find out at all what they think about government. We deal with them largely in the mass, through their sheikhs, and the sheikh's view of government is an objectionable means of extracting money. . . .'¹

So, the unvocal masses and the colonies of Jews and Christians

¹ He was James Saumarez Mann (1893-1920). See *An Administrator in the Making* (1921), pp. 258-61.

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in their midst were handed over the next year to a band of men who were, to start with, for the most part, minor bureaucrats, or little officers in the Ottoman service, and who were moved with certain primitive and virulent notions, spreading from Europe and picked second-hand in Constantinople, Cairo or the ports of the Levant; men, narrow and ignorant, devoid of loyalty and piety, of violent and ungovernable impulses.¹

It may clarify the situation in which the Jews of Iraq found themselves, as a result of this policy, if we consider the situation of another minority which found itself very early *in extremis* under the Iraqi Government. The Assyrians were Christian mountaineers long established in the Hakkari range in Southern Anatolia. During the war they came to be at odds with the Ottomans, rose, and had to fight their way under very difficult conditions through the mountains between Persia and Turkey and at last got through to Mesopotamia and were safe under the protection of the British army. After the war, they were concentrated in Mosul, just to the south of their former dwelling places, but on the other side of the mountains. They were landless, destitute, and their resettlement would require patience, skill and goodwill. When, in 1929, the British Government announced that it was giving up the mandate for Iraq, and recommending its admission to the League, the Assyrians were alarmed. Were they, then, to be left to the mercies of Muslim savages and that by the action of a Christian Imperial Power? They would not believe it, it was too absurd, a sinister joke which somebody was playing at their expense. They approached the British High Commissioner, and were told, Yes, it was true, they were going to be under the Iraqi Government. Could they then have some safeguards, at least the same communal rights as they were accustomed to under the Ottomans? No, they could not, and the High Commissioner impatiently told them 'to make the best of the inevitable and have nothing to do with such impracticable separatist pretensions'. Petitions were sent on their behalf to the League of Nations. On these petitions the comment of the British Government was: 'They are satisfied that, upon the establishment of Iraq as an independent state, member of the League of Nations, there will be no need for any special discrimination in favour of racial and religious minorities beyond such general guarantees as have been taken in the past from other candidates for admission to membership of the League.' As the High Commissioner, Sir Francis Humphrys, told the Permanent Mandates Commission, such special discrimination 'might

¹ Miss BELL quotes one of them, Jaafar al-Askari (*Letters*, II, p. 569) as follows: 'Complete independence is never given, it is always taken.' Which, she informed her father, was 'a profound saying'. This debased rhetoric represents the limit of their political wisdom.

have a tendency to prevent the minorities concerned from regarding themselves, or being themselves regarded . . . , as true citizens of their native state, in which lies the only certain hope of their future welfare'.¹ And indeed, the whole business was being taken altogether too seriously: 'Too much importance', he said, 'should not be attached to local sectarian dissensions, the explanation for which was often to be found in some purely trivial matter or incident.'² The Assyrians and the Iraqi Government were face to face, and the essence of their respective positions is to be found in a letter of the Assyrian Patriarch and an address of the Iraqi Mutassarif of Mosul. The Assyrian Patriarch pursued with the Iraqi Government his request that the Assyrian community should be granted a measure of self-government under his direction. It is a symptom of the confusion which the arrival of the West introduced that he has to borrow its inadequate political idiom, in order to describe something for which this idiom was never meant. He thus has to describe the communal government of the Ottoman system as a 'temporal power' exercised by the head of a community. The implication of this, of course, was that 'temporal power' is distinct from 'spiritual power' — a commonplace in Western thought since the sixteenth century, but unknown, till quite recently, in the East, where temporal and spiritual power were always one, and their separation a nonsensical notion, corresponding to no known reality. The Patriarch, therefore, put his case in these terms: 'The temporal power has not been assumed by me, but it has descended to me from centuries past as a legalized delegation of the people to the Patriarch. It was not only tolerated, but also officially recognized in the past by the old Sasanid Kings, Islamic Caliphs, Moghul Khans and Ottoman Sultans.'³ To speak of 'temporal power' was to concede half the game; and the Mutassarif was quick with his rejoinder, improving the occasion, too, with an original theory of Ottoman history: 'The Government do not agree to grant to Mar Shimun [the Patriarch] temporal rule, for she is not in the habit of granting such rule to any religious heads in Iraq, and there is no reason why we should make any exception to Mar Shimun. Before the World War, he was recognized as spiritual and temporal head of the Assyrians. This was due to the lax [sic] of the Turkish régime . . . But by the declining of the Turkish régime this rule was abolished . . . Any individual will be treated distinctly by the government and not through the heads who consider the peasants as their slaves, and master the results of their toil, to live easy lives.'⁴ And the argument was reinforced by the British Administrative Inspector: 'Either the Assyrians should admit that they

¹ Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Twentieth Session, p. 140.

² *Ibid.*, Minutes of the Twenty First Session, p. 114.

³ League of Nations, Official Journal, 1933, p. 1792.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1804.

are Iraqi subjects, enjoying the same rights and subjected to the same laws as the other natives of the country, whether Kurds, Arabs, Mohammedans, Christians or Jews, or they should be prepared to leave the country.¹ No, the Iraqi Government was not a Sasanid King, an Islamic Caliph, a Moghul Khan or an Ottoman Sultan. It was a modern state with all the latest Western improvements. The Assyrians were at its mercy; but they could never grasp this. In the summer of 1933, they were involved in a fracas on the Iraqi-Syrian frontier, which was the pretext for a massacre carried out by the new army of the Iraqi Government. The account of the Assyrians was well and truly settled.

Such was the situation with which the Jews — and the other minorities — had to cope. They failed to master it, because they did not know how to. They were now considered Iraqis first and Jews second — that is, as far as their duties went. When it came to their rights, they were still the second-class subjects of Ottoman times — but they had, in the meanwhile, lost all the advantages of the Ottoman arrangement: communal standing and self-government; now, as the Mutassarif of Mosul put it, 'any individual will be treated distinctly by the Government'. Leviathan was hungry. He was also ferocious. For the other great advantage of the Ottoman régime, its imperviousness to ideology and doctrinaire adventures, has also disappeared. The Iraqi Government was out to create, with the heterogeneous and unwilling elements under its control, a 'nation'. And here, the Jews would suffer from additional disadvantages. They were conspicuous: the majority of them lived in Baghdad, the capital, where their position was prominent. They were utterly without interest in this absurd attempt to form a nation; they had tried to regulate their position with the British overlord in the only way they understood; their attempt had misfired; so they withdrew into their own affairs, and looked on with superior amusement at the childish and dishonest ways of these upstarts who pretended to be a government. So that any young nationalist worth his salt would — and did — reason that the Jews, by their very presence, their very prominence, were a danger to the unity of the Iraqi nation. The young nationalists found encouragement in this train of thought from the Nazis who, about 1936, began to pay attention to the Middle East. On the pretext of making gestures against Zionism — with which the Iraqi Jews had no connection — demonstrations were organized in which Jewish shops were wrecked and looted, bombs were thrown at Jewish clubs, and individual Jews were murdered in the streets. In addition, the control of government gave the nationalists wide opportunities for petty acts of discrimination and persecution.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1805.

Then, in 1941, occurred an event which must remain a landmark in the modern history of Iraqi Jewry. In April of that year, some politicians and army officers with Nazi connections staged a *coup d'état*, and soon afterwards declared war against Great Britain. By the swiftness and decision of Mr Churchill, the movement — which could have had very serious results — was promptly snuffed out. On June 1st, its leaders were in flight, and Baghdad had fallen to the British. On the 2nd and 3rd, a massacre, evidently premeditated and planned by the collapsed régime, took place. The Jews were the victims of this massacre. Some hundreds of them were murdered, their shops and houses looted. The British Army, standing on the outskirts of Baghdad, did not interfere in any way. Mr Somerset de Chair, who was Intelligence Officer of the force, tells the story well:

'Reading came to me. "Why do our troops not go into Baghdad?" he asked. "Already they may be looting. I know. There will be many people killed if our troops do not enter."

'This was my own view and the ways of the Foreign Office were beyond my comprehension. From the hour of the Cease Fire their word had prevailed. Having fought our way, step by step, to the threshold of the city, we must now cool our heels outside. It would, apparently, be lowering to the dignity of our ally, the Regent [who had fled to Palestine at the *coup d'état*], if he were seen to be supported on arrival by British bayonets.'¹

This could not be allowed. As the British Ambassador ('whose word,' Miss Stark says, 'was the deciding factor in immediate policy') solicitously informed the Iraqi armistice delegates: 'Many years ago I fought, together with King Faisal the lamented who was my friend for the freeing of the Arabs, and together we built up the kingdom of Iraq. And do you think I would willingly see destroyed what I myself have helped to build?'² Such was the ultimate degradation of a policy which, in the days of its arrogant youth, gloried in branding every other policy for the Middle East as sordid and degrading. It has already been remarked by students of the period how many of the same men who were prominent in the Middle East in the First World War, came back to the scene of their activities in the Second.³ It remains, perhaps, to be added that the massacres

¹ S. DE CHAIR: *The Golden Carpet* (1944), p. 118.

² F. STARK: *East is West* (1945), p. 162. Compare General Maude's comment on the looting that took place in Baghdad in 1917, during its first occupation by the British Army: 'The city was rather in a turmoil, for directly the Turks went out at two o'clock in the morning, Kurds and Arabs began looting everywhere, and although we got into the city by about 6 a.m. there was time for them to do a considerable amount of damage. Still we soon reduced them to order.' CALLWELL: *Life of Maude* (1920), p. 275.

³ C. L. SULZBERGER: 'German Preparations in the Middle East,' in *Foreign Affairs*, 1942, p. 664.

also had their parallels: for in Damascus, too, in October 1918, where Lawrence had contrived to instal the Arab 'army' in sole occupation, massacres broke out a day after their entry;¹ and the Jews of Baghdad, in June 1941, stood exactly in the same relation to the Arabs and the British, as the Armenians did in Aleppo, in the massacre of February 1919.² The Jews were terrorized and demoralized completely. They had been slaughtered and looted, and nobody had come forward to protect them. Their sense of security experienced a shock from which it was never to revive afterwards. The governors of Iraq, no doubt, also realized how completely they had the Jews in their power, to do with them what they chose.

It was then that a saviour declared his presence to the Jews of Baghdad. The Zionists came to offer their help. Palestinian Jews were enrolled in, or employed by, the British Army, and the Zionists made some of these their emissaries to the Jews of Baghdad, whom otherwise they could not have hoped to reach. These emissaries argued eloquently and forcefully the Zionist thesis: that Jewish life in the Diaspora was poisonous and impossible, that the only salvation was to become pioneers on the land, in the collectives of Eretz Israel. Zionism is a doctrine that has no appeal to Oriental Jewries. Their historical experience is profoundly different from that of the East European Jewries, where Zionism was invented.³ From the start, when the Balfour Declaration was issued, the reaction of the Jews of Baghdad to Zionism was tepid, not to say unfriendly,⁴ and they kept aloof from it. As it was, the Zionists had to force themselves on their attention, when they got the opportunity after 1941. Two factors favoured the Zionists, one immediate and obvious, the other hidden and long in elaboration. In the first place, there was the recent massacre, a proof of the precarious position of the community. In the second, a long preparation had been going on, tending to favour the reception of the kind of ideas of which the Zionists were the carriers. The Western Jewries, the French one in particular, had long taken an interest in the welfare of Oriental Jewries, and had established through the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* numerous schools in North Africa, Persia and the Ottoman Empire. The personnel of these schools, unlike the American missionaries working among the Armenians, did not conceive it their duty to propagate novel theological doctrines; but inevitably, they were the agency through which 'modern', 'progressive' and so-called liberal

¹ But at least Lawrence, though later he chose to disguise the events in the *Seven Pillars*, decided after an interval to call in the British troops. See W. T. MASSEY: *Allenby's Final Triumph* (1920), p. 263.

² JEAN PICHON: *Sur la Route des Indes* (Paris, 1932), pp. 263-71.

³ On this difference, see A. J. TOYNBEE: *A Study of History*, II, pp. 240-8.

⁴ See, for instance, A. T. WILSON: *Loyalties*, p. 305.

ideas spread among the communities where they worked. They were at first opposed bitterly by the religious hierarchy and, in some cases, as in Baghdad in the 1860s, actually excommunicated, and the Jewish population forbidden contact with them.¹ Gradually, however, the resistance to them diminished, and they came to be considered as the leaders of thought in these communities. A good example of the attitude of mind they brought to their work may be found in the annual report for 1909 of the Director of the *Alliance* school in Baghdad. This is the year when the Young Turk régime, the precursor of these modern national states in the East, was consolidated. The report records the Director's reaction to the events. 'The Jews,' he says, 'were of the most enthusiastic over the triumph of liberty in this country. Well understanding the importance of the new duties which they now have to shoulder, desirous of preparing themselves for the tasks of citizenship, wishing to have a share in the economic revival which is taking place in the Empire, their first thoughts turned, as they should, to the active promotion of the official language in their schools. The study of Turkish was neglected in the past by the Jews of Baghdad. They did not use it in business, and they did not aspire to governmental posts. But now, since the coming of the liberal régime, they are zealous in the study of this hitherto neglected language.' In the 1920s and the 1930s, this was exactly the talk that the Jews of Baghdad were to hear from the Arab nationalists, in connection with the revival of classical Arabic; they are now, doubtless, hearing the same strains from the Zionists in Israel about Hebrew. There was also another thing which elicited the Director's approval: conscription, made universal by the Young Turks. 'Military service will help the bodily regeneration of this enfeebled race. It will also have other notable results. The rough life of the soldier will not only season their weakened bodies, it will also fortify their courage and give them a heightened conscience of their dignity as men and citizens.'

'Life in common under the tent or in the dormitory, the fact of undergoing the same trials and privations, of being exposed to the same dangers, of feeling the same anxieties or the same enthusiasms, will create links of solidarity and of mutual respect and esteem between the members of different sects. The Jews, morally raised in their own eyes and in the eyes of their compatriots, will know how to defend, if need be, their dignity and their honour.'² All the prestige of Europe lay behind these plausible sentiments. If, when they were preached later by the Muslim professors of 'History', which the Iraqi Government insisted on planting in Jewish schools,

¹ For a similar incident involving the Jews of Constantinople in 1862, see M. FRANCO: *Histoire des Israélites de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1897), p. 164.

² *Bulletin des Ecoles de l'Alliance Israélite*, January 1910, pp. 9-10.

Jewish students were not altogether convinced, these same sentiments did have a receptive audience when expounded, with reference to the National Home, by Zionist missionaries at clandestine meetings, in the years after 1941. The Zionists, of course, knew nothing about Oriental Jewries, neither their history, nor their condition, nor their future. All they knew was that these Jewries were in the past the object of philanthropy, and were now to become the object of proselytism. They had nothing but contempt for the way of life of these Jewries which, according to them, was primitive, feudal and unprogressive. They, the Zionists, knew how to remedy these evils. They offered trade unions and sanitation and collectives — all the things that, to their surprise, still did not make the populations among whom they, themselves, dwelt take kindly to them. All the problems then, of the Jews of Baghdad had one source, the fact of the Exile, and would all be automatically solved by migration to the Holy Land. It was this that their envoys pursued, this, and whatever possibilities there were of obtaining information to help them in their struggle against the Arabs. So they organized 'cells' of young men attracted to these ideas, taught them Hebrew, and sometimes the use of arms. The Iraqi police, larger and somewhat less inefficient than the ordinary run of government departments, could not remain in ignorance of these activities. When the Palestine War began in 1948, they made many arrests of persons more or less, or not at all, involved in Zionist activities, and in the process (as happens in these cases in countries like Iraq) proceeded to terrorize the Jewish population wholesale, terror being itself an ordinary method of government in the East and a convenient means of extracting large bribes. The organization which the Zionists had been building began, at last, to show its uses. They started to agitate and to distribute clandestine tracts, inciting the Jews to an active opposition to the rough proceedings of the Iraqi authorities; they offered facilities — though at high prices — for the smuggling of persecuted Jews to Israel; and obtained, at last, their first success by organizing a Jewish demonstration, which unseated by violence the Chief Rabbi and Head of the Community, who was opposed to Zionism. A scheme of so-called exchange of population then began to be mooted in many quarters. The idea was, it seems, to exchange the Jews of the Arab countries against the Arab refugees from Palestine. The Zionists were, *a priori*, in favour of such a scheme. It tallies very well with their doctrines,¹ and indeed, we find the Israeli Foreign Minister speaking of a 'sorting out' of populations in the Middle East as leading to 'greater stability and contentment for all concerned'.²

¹ See J. B. SCHECHTMAN: *Population Transfers in Asia* (New York, 1949), for Zionist view of the subject.

² *Manchester Guardian*, March 12th, 1952.

It is also said that the Powers were in favour of an exchange of population.¹ There was nothing implausible in this, for is it not a pendant of the National self-determination invented by them? To the Iraqi Government the idea would also have its attractions for exactly the same reasons as it appealed to the Israeli Minister — it would do away with an element which was a hindrance to national unity. In April 1950, the Iraqi Government passed a law allowing those Jews who desired it, the option to abandon their Iraqi nationality within a year from the passage of the law, and to emigrate to Israel. This gave the Zionists their big opportunity. They desired to liquidate the Jewish community in Iraq and to transport it to Palestine, on the general theoretical ground that a 'sorting out' is best; they also wanted to make Israel as much of a *fait accompli* as they could, by concentrating as many Jews in their territory as possible. There was, of course, also the loss of lives incurred in the recent war with the Arabs to be made good. So they set out to help the Iraqi Government to achieve its national unity; it was one of these tacit, monstrous complicities not entirely unknown to history. The Zionists, then, began to encourage and incite the Jews to emigrate to Israel. They pointed out to them their present miserable condition and painted in glowing colours the wonderful prospects that awaited them in Israel, where a paternal and provident government would enfold them in its all-seeing care. They were at an advantage in this work, because they seem to have captured the communal machinery set up to organize the emigration, a fact which gave them contacts, position and authority. The number of Jews who desired to emigrate was, to start with, very small; but the Zionists were persistent, and as the number of Jews registering for emigration increased, a vicious circle was created and those Jews who had no wish to emigrate found it harder to remain. It happened at that time that several bombs were thrown at Jewish places of business, at a coffee-shop where Jews used to congregate, and at a synagogue where the intending emigrants were assembled. It is alleged by the Iraqi Government that it was Zionist agents who threw these bombs at Jews.² It may be so, for the Zionists would be quite capable of using such tactics.³ Be

¹ *Observer*, September 11th, 1949.

² The allegation was made in a trial in Baghdad of those said to be responsible, but the evidence adduced is not at all convincing. It must remain an open question whether it was not Arab nationalists who threw the bombs in order to hasten the emigration. From certain remarks made by the presiding judge, the chief purpose of this trial seems to have been to prove that it was the Jews of Iraq who had brought all their sufferings on themselves, and that the Iraqi Government was in no way to blame.

³ 'Nobody in Palestine believes that the "Patria", which blew up in Haifa Harbour in 1940 loaded with illegal immigrants who were being taken by the British to Mauritius, was destroyed by its own passengers or by "refugees resolved

that as it may, the Zionists did profit from these incidents, distributing immediately afterwards warnings to the Jews to hasten the emigration; and in fact, after these incidents, Jews in their thousands registered for emigration.

By March 1951 then, the great majority of the Iraqi Jews had, obeying a variety of powerful pressures, registered for emigration. A few thousand who felt able to disregard the repressive and discriminatory treatment to which they were subjected, and the agitation of the Zionists, had decided to remain. It was then that the Iraqi Government convoked Parliament in secret session and passed two laws. The first decreed that the possessions of the emigrating Jews were to be confiscated to the profit of the Government and to be administered by a Secretariat General of Frozen Property. The possessions of the Jews of Iraq became a welcome addition to the Treasury, and yet another lucrative government department for the employment and enrichment of yet more functionaries was created. The Government of Israel protested. It declared that, such being the proceeding of Iraq, it could not but retaliate. In compensation, it would confiscate property in Israel belonging to Arab refugees. But this property the Government of Israel did not use to repay the dispossessed Iraqi Jews. The Arab refugees are still in their camps; the Iraqi Government is always ready to air their grievances in the United Nations, but not to provide for them out of the money of the dispossessed Jews. And still another pool of misery and discontent was created: the Iraqi Jews in the Israeli immigrant camps, tricked and dissatisfied, their livelihood and homes taken away from them, their coherent community destroyed, and themselves forcibly brought to the service of an ideal which they neither understood nor shared. The second edict proclaimed by Iraq concerned those Iraqi Jews who had not given up their Iraqi nationality and who were abroad, but not in Israel. It decreed that if these Jews did not return to Iraq within a specified time they would lose their nationality and their goods would be forfeit to the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Jews who may go abroad also face the same penalty. Thus the members of this remnant of a community have now to submit all their private affairs to the venal and insolent scrutiny of the officials of the Department of Frozen Property in Baghdad, and to expose themselves to the mean and dis honouring suspicions of the examiners of passports and the purveyors of visas. This second law, it is obvious, is unconstitutional, since the Constitution of Iraq guarantees legal equality to all citizens. But a remedy lies nowhere. Not in the Iraqi Courts, and not anywhere

to bring their hopeless odyssey to an end". The blowing up of the ship, in which some 250 Jews died, was a political action in a "cold war". R. WELTSCH, in *Commentary*, New York, February 1952, p. 198.

else. Israel is, of course, quite indifferent, since the state of these Jews is but a welcome proof of the contention of Zionist ideology that Jewish life in the Diaspora is impossible. And none of the Great Powers feel any interest of theirs threatened by such a situation. When the subject of these laws was brought up in Parliament here last year, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs replied in tortured and involved language as follows: '... His Majesty's Government have drawn the attention of the Iraqi Government to the unfortunate consequences which might ensue if any ground was given for a charge that those who are involved by these laws were being subjected to any form of persecution.'¹ Twenty years ago, a representative of Great Britain stood before the League of Nations and, proposing to bestow the dangerous device of sovereignty on the handful of these politicians who still bind and loose in Baghdad today, uttered these urgently persuasive words: 'His Majesty's Government fully realized its responsibility in recommending that Iraq should be admitted to the League... Should Iraq prove herself unworthy of the confidence which had been placed in her, the moral responsibility must rest with His Majesty's Government...' ² This Iraqi legislation will inevitably remind one of so much familiar Central and East European discriminatory legislation, usually directed against the Jews. Such legislation, however, was inspired by anti-semitic doctrine and found its logical culmination in the gas-chambers. We must, therefore, guard all the more against attributing the same motives to the rulers of Iraq. Anti-semitism is generally unknown in the East, though it may yet spread there.³ What we see here rather is a manifestation of the same old, deep-seated instinct for rapine which is inseparable from Eastern government. But this instinct has now at its service the techniques of administration introduced by the West. Thus, we find the Iraqi Government using administrative and financial controls, usually first introduced by British advisers and experts, for quite different ends, in order to prosecute a policy of exaction and plunder such as the East has indeed always known, but the effects of which were, in the past, largely nullified through the primitiveness of the means available to the rulers. A horrible fascination lies today in the

¹ 487 H. C. Deb. 5S, written answer by Mr Younger, April 23rd, 1951.

² Permanent Mandate's Commission, Minutes of the Twentieth Session, p. 135.

³ 'The Prime Minister [of Egypt] recognized the extent of Jewish economic power, since it controlled the economic systems of many countries, including the U.S., England, France, Egypt itself and, perhaps, even Sweden.' 'The King [of Egypt] then struck a more personal note. King Gustaf of Sweden, he said, was regarded in Egypt as being strongly pro-Jewish. And was he not also a Freemason?' F. BERNADOTTE: *To Jerusalem* (1951) pp. 27 and 70; the Iraqi Prosecutor in the Zionist Trial referred to above, quoted (without acknowledgment) from the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* to prove the immensity of the Zionist peril; a book was recently published in Beirut, in Arabic, entitled *The Plot of the Jews against Christianity*.

chaste pages of the Colonial Office reports of the 'twenties, recording the organization of this or that department of the police in Iraq, the satisfactory progress of this or that financial department.

The operation, it may be said in conclusion, was elegantly executed with the very least of fuss. The Jews of Iraq were uprooted, dispossessed and scattered in the space of a year. It is a remarkable achievement.

In 1918, when the Arab nationalists were agitating for a state in Iraq, one of them addressed the Jews of Baghdad as follows: 'Did not the Prophet Moses lead you for forty years through the wilderness in order to effect your purification? We, following his example, bring for your regeneration a pure Khalif from the wilderness.'¹ Yes, they did effect the purification of the Jews of Baghdad, and they did make them, with the help of their brethren from over the Jordan, enter the Holy Land. Thus, at last is manifested in a practical manner that Arab-Zionist co-operation on which such store was set in 1919. And further, is not Iraq now, to credit the most authentic newspaper correspondents, a prosperous and progressive state? Is it not at last satisfied, that profound *nostalgie de la boue* which so moved the European Jewries at the hour of their supreme catastrophe, and do they not have now their own postage stamps and their own ministers, their own passports and their own secret agents? Are they not now like all the nations? So is the dream at last realized, and the design in the end accomplished.

One's first impulse in the face of all this is to say, No good can come out of it. But this is in the lap of the future, and we are not diviners. Be it sufficient for the present to record that these things are evil. That persecutors and persecuted, hunters and hunted are in the grip of the powers of darkness. It is enough to elucidate how this came to pass, for the story can at least have this moral, that the consequences of action are incalculable, and that out of the desire to do good, good may not in fact ensue. The reforms proposed for the Ottoman Empire were not really reforms, but crude, ill-considered, half-hearted measures to shift power from one group to another, and to distribute it differently within the Empire. This was in itself a formidable undertaking for foreigners to attempt, their first consideration being, in any case, not this but the protection of the interests of their countries. It was therefore merely mischievous and misleading to call these measures 'reforms', as this only served to hide the nature and the extent of the problem, and to make the inevitable explosions as unexpected as they were disastrous. The process of change from one arrangement to another in the Middle East could not be easy, and the manner in which it was initiated

¹ A. T. WILSON, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920*, p. 335.

ensured that this process bore with extreme harshness on the affected populations. The improvement of conditions in the East needed knowledge, good-will and patience; the statesmen and diplomats who undertook the task were, for the most part, ignorant, indifferent and in a hurry; or, if not indifferent, then seized with unwholesome passions for Ottoman or Armenian, Arab or Zionist. Hence the atrocities incident to national self-determination, the destruction of these small frail communities with a very limited political experience, who were unable to deal with such new and terrifying manifestations, and the origin of these perverted commonwealths of the East to which no good man can give his loyalty. The measure of the failure is that today the West should be exhorted to build in the East nations where 'Moslems, Christians and Jews can and will live in harmony'.¹ The Ottoman State was organized in such a way as to fulfil precisely this requirement.

The Ottoman system was far from perfect. It was narrow and hidebound. It knew nothing of the richness, the flexibility and the opportunities existing in the Western tradition. But its conventions were well established and its modalities well understood. In due course, the habits perhaps would be capable of being fostered,

that made old wrong
Melt down as it were wax in the sun's rays.

If reforms were needed or were practicable, there is nothing clearer than that they could succeed only if they proceeded from native traditions and were accomplished with native means. The pressure, the example and the inevitable influence of Europe put this out of the question. But even if European ways had not been alien and confusing, the fact that reforms were inextricably mixed with the interests of the Powers was enough to bedevil everything. If there had to be European reforms, if 'nations' were going to be built up, there was only one way by which these operations could prove beneficial and not catastrophic. It was for Europe itself to administer them and carry them through. This proved impossible, either because of the rivalries of the Powers, or because such a course was rejected by Europeans as imperialistic and immoral, or, finally, because of that failure of nerve and morality which made attractive the exercise of power and influence without responsibility.

The fate of minorities such as the Armenians, or the Jews of Iraq, is merely an extreme result of the turmoil introduced by the West in the East. But even where the results are not so extreme and final, the condition of the East is today pitiful enough. From the West there can be no escape: the Armenians tried to emulate its political ways,

¹ R. MONTAGNE, 'Modern Nations and Islam', *Foreign Affairs*, July 1952, p. 592.

the Jews of Iraq tried to ignore them. For both disaster lay in wait. What can be said of these, can also be said of other groups, and of the other Western innovations, economic or cultural, to which they must submit. They are all delivered over into the power of the legions of ill-will abroad in the world. The dangers are manifold; the remedies scant and impotent.

'POETICAL SKETCHES' AND 'HYPERION'

BERNARD BLACKSTONE

THE question of Keats's knowledge of Blake's poems has been raised from time to time, but never with any great assiduity or confidence. The usual view has been that Blake's existence was too obscure, and his writings too inaccessible, for any possibility of contact. C. L. Finney, for instance, discussing certain of Keats's minor verses (*the Daisy's Song*, the *Devon Maid*, the Teignmouth lines in letter 35, and *The Stranger Lighted from his Steed*) mentions qualities which 'induced D. G. Rossetti, H. B. Forman, de Selincourt, and Miss Lowell to believe that [these poems] were influenced by Blake's songs. We should remember, however, that Blake's poems were almost wholly unknown in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and that there is not a single reference to Blake in the voluminous records of Keats's life and poetry'.

The last assertion is certainly true, the preceding one more doubtful. Coleridge and Lamb knew Blake and his poems; all three men frequented the Aders circle. Through Lamb, Haydon and Dilke there may be an immediate connection between Blake and Keats.¹ There has always been a tendency to exaggerate Blake's obscurity and lack of friends. As for his poems, it should be noted that *Poetical Sketches* at least was issued by the ordinary processes and that, even if not more than fifty copies were printed,² one of these may well have found its way into the hands of Dilke or Haydon. In any case, poems from *Poetical Sketches* and *Songs of Innocence and Experience* had been published in Malkin's well-known *A Father's Memoirs of his Child* (1806). And both Coleridge and Lamb have left us interesting criticism of Blake's verse and prose.

A recent study of Keats has left me in no doubt that he knew *Poetical Sketches* and was powerfully influenced by them. It is not difficult to see why this should be so. Here was a volume of poems, antedating *Lyrical Ballads* and without their doctrinaire and moralizing tone (to which Keats so strongly objected), which already proclaimed (the date is 1783) a new direction in English poetry. Here was a breath of life after the Hayleys and the Darwins, the Mrs

¹ Dr. Keynes thinks that Blake and Haydon must have met before 1811, and that 'through Haydon Blake might have met Keats'. I doubt the likelihood of a personal contact; had it occurred, its influence on Keats's work and still more on his life must have been decisive. But see G. KEYNES, *Blake Studies*, ch. ix, 'Blake with Lamb and his Circle'.

² Keynes's very conservative estimate in *Blake Studies*, ch. iii.

Carters and the Mrs Barbaulds. Here were freshness of perception, a revelling in the data of the senses, a purity of English, and (in *To the Muses*) an attack on Augustan versifying which Keats was to paraphrase in *Sleep and Poetry*. Where Blake was derivative, he was derivative from gods of Keats's own idolatry: Shakespeare, Spenser, Chatterton. Both poets try their prentice hand at an *Imitation of Spenser*. Both are attracted to the drama. Both are essentially spontaneous, untaught, richly sensitive.

Both (and I do not think this point has been noted before) are fascinated by the quaternary. In a previous essay on Blake I have demonstrated the value of the number four in *Poetical Sketches* and all his subsequent work. We can link this theme to the Pythagorean tetractys, to the composition of the human psyche as seen by Blake and Jung, to the cosmic quaternions of the seasons, the elements and the points of the compass, to the four Vedas and the Taoist king surrounded by his four primacies. This last image is, in Blake, Albion the Universal Man with the Four Zoas; in Keats's *Endymion* too there is a Shepherd King intimately related to the four elements. Keats picks up a Shakespearean treatment of the quaternary theme in his sonnet *The Human Seasons*, for his Hermetic sense of the macro-microcosm is strongly developed. Down to the minutest detail — the knight kisses the Belle Dame sans Merci 'with kisses four' — the pattern persists. But this is matter for a separate paper.

Before coming on to my main theme, which is the Blakean influence in the first book of *Hyperion*, I would like to draw attention to two passages of early Keats which seem notably indebted to *Poetical Sketches*. The first is the 'Sorrow song' of the Indian maid in *Endymion* IV, and more especially its concluding stanza:

Come then, Sorrow,
Sweetest Sorrow!

Like an own babe I nurse thee on my breast:

I thought to leave thee,
And deceive thee,

But now of all the world I love thee best.

There is not one,
No, no, not one

But thee to comfort a poor lonely maid;

Thou art her mother,
And her brother,

Her playmate, and her wooer in the shade.

Let us put this by the side of a passage of Ossianic prose from *Poetical Sketches* — the conclusion of *Contemplation*:

Even in childhood Sorrow slept with me in my cradle; he followed me up and down in the house when I grew up; he was

my schoolfellow: thus was he in my steps and in my play, till he became to me as my brother. I walked through dreary places with him, and in church-yards; and I oft found myself sitting by Sorrow on a tomb-stone!

The similarity is perhaps not, by itself, decisive; but we shall return to these prose fragments later.

The second assimilation I should like to make is between the central episode of *Isabella*, which is too well known for quotation, and these verses of *Fair Elenor*:

Thus having spoke, she raised up her head,
And saw the bloody napkin by her side,
Which in her arms she brought; and now, tenfold
More terrified, saw it unfold itself.

Its eyes were fixed; the bloody cloth unfolds,
Disclosing to her sight the murder'd head
Of her dear lord, all ghastly pale, clotted
With gory blood; it groan'd, and thus it spake:

O Elenor, behold thy husband's head,
Who, sleeping on the stones of yonder tower,
Was 'reft of life by the accursed duke!
A hired villain turn'd my sleep to death!

She sat with dead cold limbs, stiffen'd to stone;
She took the gory head up in her arms;
She kiss'd the pale lips; she had no tears to shed;
She hugg'd it to her breast, and groan'd her last.

The wormy circumstance of *Isabella*, so alien to the spirit of Boccaccio, may owe something to these Gothic extravagances.

These are pointers which lead me to believe that Keats was in fact acquainted with *Poetical Sketches*, and that in his early work he was influenced by them. But the title of this paper promises something more, and something more surprising. What can be the connection between Blake's first volume of lyrics and Keats's attempt at the epic?

In establishing this connection I shall have to rely chiefly on the methods of the research student and the literary detective. I shall have to set passages side by side and tessellate phrases. It is humiliating and boring. In the end a result, I think, emerges. But let us see first if we cannot do something else: if we cannot, perhaps, recreate the state of mind Keats was in while he was writing the first book of *Hyperion*, the state of mind which made a mental flashback to

Poetical Sketches, or a re-reading of them, inevitable. For in doing so we shall accomplish two things. We shall render far more plausible any evidence which a scrutiny of the phrasing of *Hyperion* may yield; and we shall find a *raison d'être* for our whole enterprise by lifting it from the plane of literary detection on to the more respectable level of interpretation.

It is well known, to begin with, that Keats was not a happy man when he began writing *Hyperion*. He was watching at the bedside of a dying brother; and the thought of death, now and later, was much with him. It is not generally appreciated how much the theme of death colours even Keats's happier perceptions.

Verse, Fame, and Beauty are intense indeed,
But Death intenser — Death is Life's high meed,

Keats was to write in March 1819 as the final couplet of the sonnet *Why did I laugh tonight?* He asked himself that question: and he gave up the writing of *Hyperion*. He could write no more. The sonnet is a poem of self-knowledge:

Heart! Thou and I are here, sad and alone;
Say, wherefore did I laugh? O mortal pain!
O Darkness! Darkness! ever must I moan,
To question Heaven and Hell and Heart in vain.

Keats had come to the crossroads, to the Blakean knowledge of the contraries, pain and pleasure, love and hate,

Weaving to Dreams the Sexual strife
And weeping over the Web of Life.

And he was all unprepared to face this knowledge. Let us understand this clearly. He was unprepared by education and association for the immediate self-knowledge. Yet he alone of Blake's contemporaries, with the possible exception of Coleridge, was innately capable of it. In his anguish and uncertainty, unhelped by Haydon and Hunt, by Benjamin Bayley and Charles Brown, his mind turned back to the little volume of poems he had read not so long before.

Keats may have known other of Blake's writings. Personally, I think he did; I think he had read the *Songs of Innocence and Experience*, but that is a conjecture I am not at present prepared to support. What is interesting is that when his mind turned back to *Poetical Sketches*, the pieces remembered in his need were not the masterpieces most of us have in mind when that title recurs to us — not *To the Evening Star* or *My silks and fine array* — but other things that most of us forget: the fragments of Ossianic prose, *Prologue to King John*, *Contemplation*, *Samson*, and *The Couch of Death*.

To ask Why? and to answer the question would take us far afield:

into the history of the reputation of Ossian in the early nineteenth century (a theme not yet adequately explored), into the particular reasons for Blake's interest and Keats's, into the need for an indigenous heroic myth, into the helps sought by Keats in writing *Hyperion*. We should have to go much more closely than has hitherto been done into his reliance on Davies's *Celtic Researches*, a book he had on his shelves; we should have to modify the current conception of his personality to include an inveterate traditionalism, a mind 'complete and true in sacred custom'. The phrase refers, in *Endymion*, to the 'mimic temple' which the hero finds within 'the sparry hollows of the world'; but it might refer as well to the 'fane' which Keats builds 'in some untrodden region of my mind' to the human Psyche. *Ut supra, ita et infra*. The Hermetic dictum is fully reversible. But this point, with others allied to it, must wait for an investigation of the 'adorable Tetractys'.¹

There is, implicit in the title of the last Ossianic fragment listed, an easier approach. *The Couch of Death!* There was Keats, watching day by day and night by night the dying agony of his brother Tom.² Here was Blake, recounting another, an imaginary deathbed:

The veiled Evening walked solitary down the western hills, and Silence reposed in the valley; the birds of day were heard in their nests, rustling in brakes and thickets; and the owl and bat flew round the darkening trees: all is silent when Nature takes her repose . . . the remains of a family of the tribes of Earth, a mother and a sister were gathered to the sick bed of a youth . . . they stood by the bed like reeds bending over a lake, when the evening drops trickle down. His voice was low as the whisperings of the woods when the wind is asleep, and the visions of Heaven unfold their visitation. 'Parting is hard, and death is terrible; I seem to walk through a deep valley, far from the light of day, alone and comfortless. . . .'

And as he heard that voice speaking 'not to the sensual ear', Keats began:

Deep in the shady sadness of a vale,
Far sunken from the healthy breath of morn,
Far from the fiery noon, and eve's one star,
Sat grey-haired Saturn, quiet as a stone,
Still as the silence round about his lair;
Forest on forest hung about his head
Like cloud on cloud. No stir of air was there,
Not so much life as on a summer's day

¹ The phrase is Coleridge's (*Nonesuch Coleridge*, p. 465).

² And remembering, not improbably, how Blake had gone through an identical experience in 1787. Robert Blake died, like Tom Keats, of consumption.

Rob not one light seed from the feather'd grass,
But where the dead leaf fell, there did it rest.

'Parting is hard, and death is terrible.' Keats felt that; we know from his letters what Tom meant to him. In his trouble, he sought relief in 'abstractions', in the writing of *Hyperion*; as he wrote, his imagination caught up the phrases and the situation of Blake's prose. For here is the shady and silent valley, 'far from the light of day'; here are the remains of a family, if not of earth, of heaven; here is the death, if not of an individual, of a hierarchy. Keats watches by the deathbed of a brother, not a mother and sister; but the 'anima' figure reappears in the poem in the shape of the maternal Thea.

'His voice was low as the whispering of the woods when the wind is asleep'; is it too bold to recognize in this the origin of the marvellous passage which, a little later on, describes the speech of Thea?

As when, upon a tranced summer night,
Those green-robed senators of mighty woods,
Tall oaks, branch-charmèd by the earnest stars,
Dream, and so dream all night without a stir,
Save for one gradual solitary gust
Which comes upon the silence, and dies off,
As if the ebbing air had but one wave:
So came these words and went.

Certainly the basic image is there; and we find it reinforced, at the close of the Blake fragment, by apposite detail. I italicize for clarity's sake.

The traveller that hath taken shelter under *an oak*, eyes the distant country with joy! Such smiles were seen upon the face of the youth; a visionary hand wiped away his tears, and a ray of light beamed around his head! *All was still*. The moon hung not out her lamp, and *the stars faintly glimmered in the summer sky; the breath of night slept among the leaves of the forest*.

Even the 'senators' (a rare word in both Blake and Keats) are found in an adjacent Ossianic fragment, *Prologue to King John*.

These are among the verbal and situational similarities — to which we must return. But such echoes would hardly have found their way into Keats's poem had it not been in the context of a fundamental agreement of tone and atmosphere. Keats was writing of the wars of ancient gods; his theme was heroic and archaic. At the back of this, of course, was Milton as an overt influence; but there is also the pressure of Celtic legend. 'Ossian' was not finally exploded in Keats's day. To those poets looking round for 'primitive models' he seemed to be a great original. His mighty forms, engaged in prehistoric conflict, his evocation of a world long past — these had their

value for Keats. They had their value even as seen in the derivative Ossianics of Blake. The 'aged senators' of the *Prologue to King John* are akin to the Titans of *Hyperion*.

Round his majestic feet deep thunders roll; each heart does tremble, and each knee grows slack. The stars of heaven tremble; the roaring voice of war, the trumpet, calls to battle! Brother in brother's blood must bathe, rivers of death! O land, most hapless! O beauteous island, how forsaken! Weep from thy silver fountains; weep from thy gentle rivers!

Internecine strife shaking the heavens here, as in *Hyperion*, is counterpointed with a lyrical tenderness; so too the 'severe magnificence' of Hyperion's palace —

There standing fierce beneath, he stamp'd his foot,
And from the basements deep to the high towers
Jarr'd his own golden region; and before
The quavering thunder thereupon had ceased,
His voice leapt out . . .

— is contrasted with the pastoral loveliness of Apollo's isle —

Chief isle of the embowered Cyclades,
Rejoice, O Delos, with thine olives green!

I would not press the verbal similarities here: what I have in mind are the subtler yet quite perceptible affinities of atmosphere. The apostrophic violence of Keats's gods —

His voice leapt out, despite of godlike curb,
To this result: 'O dreams of day and night!
O monstrous forms! O effigies of pain!
O spectres busy in a cold, cold gloom!'

— is much more Blakean than it is Miltonic. Saturn, in the opening passage to which we may now return, has all Blake's feeling for the *emptiness* of space, the Newtonian void. 'Through the void space I walk', mourns the sufferer in *The Couch of Death*; and Saturn in *Hyperion* echoes:

space starr'd, and lorn of light,
Space region'd with life-air, and barren void;
Spaces of fire, and all the yawn of hell.

We are conscious of cosmic pressures absent from Milton's tidy universe.

To come down to earth once more, and to the immediate situation of Saturn and Thea, of the dying youth and his mother. We have seen how both Blake and Keats stress the elements of seclusion,

silence, sorrow; how both throw around the statuesque grouping of archaic figures the darkness of the valley, the overhanging forest, the stream and the stars. Focusing more closely on the groups themselves, we find these too almost identical in pattern. There are three figures in Blake — mother, sister, and youth:

Sorrow linked them together, leaning on one another's necks alternately — like lilies, dropping tears in each other's bosom, they stood by the bed like reeds bending over a lake, when the evening drops trickle down.

In Keats the principal figures are two — Thea and Saturn — but then, as if to rectify this, Keats introduces at the very beginning a third figure, as silent as the sister in *The Couch of Death*:

the Naiad 'mid her reeds
Press'd her cold finger closer to her lips.

As in Blake, Keats's Thea leans on Saturn's neck. Saturn's 'old right hand' lies 'nerveless, listless, dead' on the sodden ground; in *The Couch of Death* the youth exclaims: 'My hand is feeble, how should I stretch it out?' The 'aged woman' raises her voice 'like the sound of a broken pipe' to say: 'O my son, my son, I know but little of the path thou goest!'; while in *Hyperion* 'the sad goddess' asserts 'in solemn tenour and deep organ tone': 'I have no comfort for thee, no not one.' The youth replies 'like a voice heard from a sepulchre'; Saturn complains that he is

smother'd up
And buried from all godlike exercise.

The youth cries out for help:

'O my dear friends, pray ye for me! Stretch forth your hands, that my helper may come! Through the void space I walk between the sinful world and eternity! Beneath me burns eternal fire! O for a hand to pluck me forth!'

Similarly, Saturn calls upon Thea:

Search, Thea, search,
Open thine eyes eterne, and sphere them round
Upon all space: space starr'd, and lorn of light,
Space region'd with life-air; and barren void;
Spaces of fire, and all the yawn of hell.
Search, Thea, search! and tell me if thou seest
A certain shape or shadow, making way
With wings or chariot fierce to reposess
A heaven he lost erewhile.

Such echoes as these, in a common sequence, cannot be accidental. Together with the identity of situation and atmosphere, they are conclusive evidence, it seems to me, that Keats had read and been much moved by *Poetical Sketches*. This fact might, indeed, have been as easily if not as dramatically established by an analysis of *Endymion*; but there the purely personal element, which gives such interest to our inquiry here, would have been absent. These *Hyperion* echoes are to me tokens of the very intimate value which Blake's work had for Keats at this crisis in his life. And that is a deeply affecting thought. We cannot help considering what Blake's personal friendship would have meant to Keats, when we see how much significance these very minor pieces had for him. Keats would have found in Blake the creative wisdom he was in such sore need of; Blake would have found in Keats one of the few who could understand him. But, as it would seem, they never met. We know Keats's diffidence in making acquaintances; we know his desire to preserve his own 'unfettered scope'; but all the same we cannot but regret that he did not, on one of those winter evenings when he was pondering the first book of *Hyperion* and Tom lay slowly dying, walk round to South Molton Street to call on Mr Blake.

BUTLER'S 'ANALOGY'

S. A. GRAVE

1

BUTLER, who wrote the *Analogy of Religion*, died on June 16th, 1752. He has had a big but provincial reputation. To Newman he was always 'the greatest name in the Anglican Church'; and from Newman's Anglican death-bed, appeared for a time to be even a 'mark' of his Church's catholicity as its other criteria failed — 'What a note of the Church is the mere production of a man like Butler'. At Oxford in the first half of the last century Butler's *Sermons* had a status which no other book in moral philosophy enjoyed, except Aristotle's *Ethics*. Outside the English-speaking world little attention was paid to him. Gladstone mentions two neglected German, and one unread French, versions of the *Analogy*, adding, 'it has however been translated into Hindooostanee, in connection with missionary purposes; and into Welsh'.

The neglect of the *Analogy* has spread to England. Its former professional students, the Church of England clergy, turned from it to other apologists; and with their desertion its pressure eased on the attention of philosophers who were inclined to take philosophical divinity seriously, so that not much has been heard about it for a long time. With Butler's ethics once more topical, it is likely that its argument will be noticed and seen to be not an obsolete bit of eighteenth-century controversy but as much our contemporary as any argument.

I propose here to sketch out the apologetic structure of the *Analogy* and to discuss briefly the casuistry of assent which, I think, determines it. Butler's expositors have not made it clear that they grasped either perfectly.

Historically the *Analogy* is a treatise against Deism and so was written against philosophies that had no future. The conservative Deist opinions were not autonomous speculation but stages in the unfinished decay of faith which had been going on for two hundred years. The 'natural religion' which the Deists set against revelation was that part of the Christian religion not yet disbelieved, and whether demonstrable in principle or not, was in fact derived from its 'republication' in Christianity and did not survive its isolation from the rest of Christian doctrine. Radical Deism, the thin metaphysic of a 'First Mover', was already beyond religion and lasted only until metaphysicians in one way or another got the universe into self-movement.

But though the Deist philosophies are obsolete many of the Deists' criticisms of orthodox religion are not. These ranged from complaints about the literary style of the Bible (that it was insufficiently Augustan to have God for its author — 'quel ton, quel ton effroyable', as a cultivated lady remarked of the Prophets) to the objections, as timeless as Butler's replies to them, of plain clever men to fundamental points of divinity.

Clarke, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, divided Deists into four classes: (1) Those who admitted that God made the world but denied that he looks after it. (2) Those who admitted a natural but not a moral providence; they held that God orders the course of nature but does not care about virtue or vice. (3) Those who admitted a natural and a moral providence in this life but denied rewards and punishments after death. (4) Those who admitted the whole of natural religion but denied a revealed religion.¹

The *Analogy* is the explicit defence of the doctrines denied by the second, third and fourth of these classes on the premisses they respectively held. Extreme Deism is eliminated from discussion by the postulate of the *Analogy* which Butler supposes proved: that 'there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor of the World'.

Butler's defence is based on 'the analogy of religion natural and revealed to the constitution and course of nature'. He uses his principle of analogy positively and negatively: Positively: the important similarities between the systems of nature and religion suggest that the Author of nature authorizes the system of religion. Negatively: (a) If certain features in the systems of nature and religion seem to conflict with God's goodness, wisdom and power, our experienced incapacity to judge of the propriety of means adapted to ends, where some of these ends are known only vaguely and others are quite unknown, shows analogously that we must be incompetent critics of the perfection of divine providence. (b) If certain features in the system of nature are after all admitted to be consistent with the goodness, wisdom and power of God, similar features in the system of what is claimed to be revealed religion cannot be held incompatible with these attributes.

That is an outline of the analogical strategy of Butler's work. There is also frequent tactical use of analogy in the elaboration of grounds of belief which lie outside the main analogical thesis; for example, in answering objection to the evidence for miracles and prophecy, Butler estimates the weight of his analogical reasoning in the following words:

The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large

¹ *The Obligations of Natural Religion, etc.*, 7th ed., pp. 155-73.

extent, and consists of several parts, in some, more, in others, less, exact. In some few instances perhaps it may amount to a real practical proof; in others, not so. Yet in these it is a confirmation of what is proved other ways. It will undeniably show, what too many want to have shown them, that the system of religion, both natural and revealed, considered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule unless that of nature be so too. And it will afford an answer to almost all objections against the system both of natural and revealed religion; though not perhaps an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree an answer to the objections against the evidence of it.¹

It will be seen how little Butler claims for the positive analogy — 'in some few instances perhaps' it may amount to a proof strong enough to act on without hesitation; where it fails independently it confirms the *a priori* proofs not used in the *Analogy*. By contrast he claims a great deal for the negative analogy — it answers most of the objections to religion.

The apologetic structure of the *Analogy* is, negatively, the refutation of objections to orthodox religion; and positively, the establishment of some probable grounds of belief. I shall illustrate the comparative rigour of the negative and positive argument by an outline of Butler's treatment of his main topics. This outline, of course, does no sort of justice to Butler's discussion; the *Analogy* is so concentrated that any summary of it is painfully unsatisfactory. The thesis of Part I is that there is a future life when the good will be rewarded and the bad punished by a just God.

It is a failure to appreciate the significance of the negative and positive argument which accounts for the puzzled disappointment over Butler's first chapter, 'Of a future life'. Butler's readers used to wonder why he did not put up a better case for immortality while he was about it. But he was not about it — not primarily. His main purpose in this chapter was to prove that there are no good reasons for believing we are destroyed by death: none from analogy and none from 'the reason of the thing', i.e. from the nature of death, since all we know about death is some of its effects, such as rotting flesh. The discussion is long, careful (and not very successful). By contrast, he argues almost perfunctorily for survival: there is some reason to think that the self is simple, and, if so, some reason to think that it is indestructible. The axiom of 'continuance'² (depen-

¹ *Analogy* (Gladstone's large edition), Introduction, p. 16.

² 'There is in every case a probability, that all things will continue as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in which we have some reason to think they will be altered.' Pt. I, Ch. 1, p. 23.

dent for its application on the success of the negative argument), and the continuity of man's existence through great changes from conception to maturity make it analogically credible that death is not the end of him. There is a 'presumption' of a future life. So Butler says, though the mood of the chapter is the mood of:

If I lie down upon my bed I must be here,
But if I lie down in my grave I may be elsewhere.

The presumption of a future life is strengthened by our moral experience, which, at the same time, acquaints us with the justice of God. That a just administration of this world is carried on to some degree is certain because the natural consequences of virtue and vice (i.e. as Butler reminds us, the consequence appointed by the Author of nature) are, when nothing hinders, happiness and unhappiness respectively. And the degree to which a moral providence plainly is carried on is 'enough to give us the apprehension that it shall be completed, or carried on to that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall' (Pt. I, ch. III, p. 66). This experience of fragmentary justice, and the expectation of its perfection, is reinforced by the declarations of conscience, God's vicar, on the divine character and human destiny. 'For since God's method of government is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring, upon whom his punishment shall be inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed . . . The conclusion, that God will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked, is not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit that *he should*; but from its appearing, that he has told us *he will*. And this he hath certainly told us, in the promise and threatening, which it hath been observed, the notion of a command implies, and the sense of good and ill desert which he has given us, more distinctly expresses' (Pt. I, ch. VI, pp. 150-2).

Negatively, the fact that God does punish vice as such in this world fully answers 'all objections against the credibility of a future state of punishments, from any imaginations, that the frailty of our nature and external temptations, almost annihilate the guilt of human vices: as well as objections of another sort; from necessity; from suppositions, that the will of an infinite Being cannot be contradicted; or that he must be incapable of offence and provocation' (Pt. I, ch. II, p. 62).

The sombre theodicy which completes Butler's treatment of a moral providence, and is at once what he has to say on the mystery of evil and on 'the idle and not very innocent employment' of imagining worlds which God might have made if he had been good and wise and powerful enough, is almost entirely negative — 'We

are incompetent judges'. We do not know the whole design of God's providence and until we do we are not in a position to criticize items in it. We do know by experience that ends, perhaps unrealizable in any other way, are sometimes procured by means which, before experience, we should have supposed would have even a contrary effect. And this makes it analogically credible that if we knew all God intended, 'we should find the permission of the disorders objected against to be consistent with justice and goodness; and even to be instances of them' (Pt. I, Ch. vii, p. 175). On the other hand, we do not know whether the alternative universes (schemes without any temporary irregularities in the distribution of happiness; or schemes in which irregularities are miraculously rectified the moment they occur and the damage done by miracle, miraculously repaired; or no schemes at all but isolated particular providences) are possible, and, if possible, more valuable than the universe God made. And supposing they are both, we do not know that God has a duty to make the best of possible worlds. What we do know are analogies which make it likely that these utopian universes are either not possible or less valuable. Talk about the better worlds God might have made is chatter 'quite at random and in the dark'.

The positive element in, or rather behind, this theodicy is supplied by the statement that our whole nature requires us to ascribe moral perfection to God.

The second part of the *Analogy* is concerned with the objections to and the evidence for revelation. Though Butler emphasizes the strength of the external evidence for Christianity from the historical testimony to miracles and the fulfilment of prophecy, his analogical dialectic against the Deism which professed to deny revealed religion because it accepted natural religion, still illustrates the difference between the demonstrative aim of the negative and the tentative presumptive character of the positive argument. His summary is:

From analogical reasoning, Origen has with singular sagacity observed, that he who believes the scripture to have proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature. And in a like way of reflection it may be added, that he who denies the scripture to have been from God upon account of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny the world to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation of Providence, which revelation informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of Providence which experience together with reason informs us of, i.e. the known course of nature; this is a presumption, that they have both

the same author and cause; at least so far as to answer objections against the former's being from God, drawn from anything analogical or similar to what is in the latter, which is acknowledged to be from him. (Introduction, pp. 9-10.)

To the Deists who, confessing a perfect God as creator of the world, maintained that he could not be responsible for anything so imperfect as the Christian religion, Butler says: 'You cannot consistently make the kind of objections you do to Christianity because exactly the same sort of objections lie against the natural religion you profess.' That is the negative contention. The positive contention (which, in the passage just quoted, turns back into the negative) is that similar features in the economy of nature and what is claimed as revelation are a presumption that both have the same origin.¹

All through the *Analogy* there is the difference between the purpose and cogency of the two kinds of argument. And it remains in the total impact, even when the cumulative effect of Butler's evidence for religion is calculated as he says it must be calculated. Butler did not try (and therefore did not fail) to *prove* the truth of natural religion and Christianity. He did try to refute decisively the objections to them. On the positive side he contented himself with 'credibility', 'presumption', 'probability', at the most, with 'strong probability' and 'strong evidence'. I shall make my point extravagantly by saying that the strength of the positive argument is accidental to the apologetic of the *Analogy*. For the *Analogy* is an apologetic of understatement, of reduced evidence. It is so, because what, in effect, Butler has to say to the reader who is willing, even hesitatingly, to admit that religion is more likely to be true than false is this: If the evidence for religion was ever so much greater than you imagine it to be it would be no more your duty to assent than it is now. And this brings us to the casuistry of assent which, I think, determines Butler's procedure.

2

In questions of difficulty, or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen; if the result of examination be, that there appears upon the whole, any the lowest presumption on one side, and none on the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the lowest degree greater; this determines the question, even in matters of speculation; and in matters of practice, will lay us

¹ Neglect of the distinction between the two kinds of argument allows Professor Willey to write that 'an eighteenth century saint asks us to believe Revelation to be authentic because [Professor Willey's italics] it is as bewildering as an admittedly divine Nature'. *The Eighteenth Century Background*, p. 81.

under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act upon that presumption or low probability, though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth. For surely a man is as really bound in prudence to do what, upon the whole appears, according to the best of his judgment, to be for his happiness, as what he certainly knows to be so.

Nay further, in questions of great consequence a reasonable man will think it concerns him to remark lower possibilities and presumptions than these; such as amount to no more than showing one side of a question to be as supposable and credible as the other: nay, such as but amount to much less than this. For numberless instances might be mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act, and with great application too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much less and where the probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding. (Introduction, pp. 6-7.)

Before discussing these statements in detail, something should be said about the significance of the notion of probability in the *Analogy*. The sentence introducing the passage is the famous aphorism that 'to us, probability is the very guide of life', which follows the remark that nothing is merely probable to omniscience, but is known by God to be simply true or false. I think it is a mistake to interpret Butler as meaning that since (rather than *when*) knowledge is impossible for us we must put up with the probability that belongs to our condition, and a consequent mistake to regard the *Analogy* as a treatise in theological probability, prefaced by the reminder that certainty is unattainable in any field of inquiry. Apart from the fact that in Butler's philosophy agnosticism is balanced by equally strong certainties, any general theory of the speculative limitations of the human intellect is irrelevant to the *Analogy*, resting as it does, not on an epistemology, but on an economy of probability. So that when Butler says that probability is the guide of life he is proposing no speculative principle but a practical maxim: anybody who in any matter finds that he cannot be certain, is obliged to regulate his conduct upon probability with as much energy as upon certainty. In the *Analogy* Butler is not maintaining that the evidences of religion are absolutely of such and such an order of probability, for he is not writing a scientific manual of evidences at all, but aiming only to secure the admission that there is some presumption of the truth of religion and none of its falsity.

The casuistry of assent which Butler outlines in the passage quoted above seems puzzlingly inconsistent. He begins by saying

that in 'matters of speculation' the balance of probability should determine assent. He is, of course, wrong if he means that it is never permissible to suspend judgment. A scientist or philosopher is not obliged to believe what merely appears more probable than it is contradictory. He may (often should) suspend judgment, or equivalently, assent to the probability of the proposition without assenting to its truth. There are, however, classes of propositions with regard to which suspension of judgment is not possible, and it is to these that Butler must be referring if he is not making an elementary mistake. First, there are those whose truth or falsity would dictate opposite courses of behaviour. In their case intellectual neutrality amounts to practical disbelief; judgment is suspended in theory but not in practice. The agnostic, for example, is not more devout (unless schizophrenically) than the atheist. (Incidentally, where it is necessary to act effectively, it is necessary to believe unreservedly, degrees of assent proportioned to degrees of evidence is a luxury which action cannot afford.) Secondly, where assent is already engaged to certain propositions, suspension of judgment on their contraries is not even speculatively possible. Refusal to believe them true means not only that one acts as if they were false but also that one simply believes them false. Whoever accepts a creed, for instance, must deny other creeds where they conflict with his own, even if he admits that the others are as probable as his own. It is, no doubt, the sort of assertions which must either be believed or disbelieved, because action controlled by belief or disbelief is inescapable, that Butler has in mind when he says that the apparent balance of probability, however slight, is to determine assent.

Butler goes on to remark that in 'matters of practice' we are as bound in self-interest to do what we think, as what we know will be for our happiness. Prudence requires that a man has got to be prepared, if his whole happiness is at stake, to act on an even chance, or perhaps against all probability of success. The question is whether Butler is modifying his canon of assent to fit in with the possible demands of action. In particular, what is the significance of the statement that 'in question of great consequence, a reasonable man will think it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions than these; such as amount to no more than showing one side of a question to be as supposable and credible as the other: nay, such as but amount to much less even than this'? Does Butler mean that if there are propositions which must either be believed or disbelieved, and belief in them would be to our great advantage if they turned out to be true, we are bound in prudence, to take a chance on their being true; that we ought to believe them though they appear no more likely to be true than false, or even if they appear less likely to be true than false; just as we ought to be ready

to take a fifty-fifty chance, or less than a fifty-fifty chance, in an action which, if successful, would be to our great advantage? Religious persuasion sometimes takes this form and it is worth while asking how far it has Butler's sanction.

It should first be noticed that the fact that it is sometimes necessary to act against probability is no justification for ever believing against probability. There is, indeed, no analogy between the two. In taking a deliberate chance that is unlikely to come off, two sorts of belief are involved. One is about the chance of success; the other about the advantage of success. Both are determined by apparent probabilities. Action on a forlorn hope does not require a belief that the hope is not forlorn. It would be pathological, if it were possible, to believe that what you see is a remote chance of success is a good chance of success. Assent to a proposition against the evidence involves two sorts of belief. One is the belief in the proposition, contrary to its apparent probability; the other is the belief that belief in this proposition is likely to be to your interest.

If then Butler, influenced by a misleading analogy from action, implies in what he says about taking a chance against probability, that anyone deliberately judging that certain doctrines are unlikely to be true can nevertheless have a *duty* in prudence to believe them, he is maintaining the contrary of his principle that the balance of probability must determine assent; if that anyone can have a *right* in prudence to assent under these circumstances, he contradicts his principle. And since it is a part of prudence to be virtuous, and a part of virtue to respect the appearance of truth, these opinions would be imprudent, not to say vicious, recommendations.

Two other passages in the *Analogy* relevant to the motives of assent help to show that these are not Butler's opinions, and how he came to write as if they were:

Nor should I dissuade anyone from setting down, what he thought made for the contrary side [i.e. against the truth of Christianity]. But then it is to be remembered, not in order to influence his judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous,¹ than a mistake on the other . . . To be influenced by this consideration in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed as much prejudice as anything whatever. And, like other prejudices, it operates contrary ways, in different men; for some are inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. And it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men's passions in order to gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning

¹ Not that Butler holds that anyone is going to be damned for honest unbelief. Pt. II, ch. vi, p. 282.

conduct, there is nothing which reason more requires to be taken into the account, than the importance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what would be the consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary manner; still, that taking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be attended with the greatest, must appear, to unprejudiced reason, of the highest moment towards determining how we are to act (Pt. II, ch. vii, p. 351).

That the practice of religion *is* reasonable, may be shown, though no more could be proved, than that the system of it *may* be so, for aught we know to the contrary (Pt. II, ch. viii, p. 362).

The first of these passages seems inconsistent with its context. The second seems inconsistent with the first. The first expressly eliminates every motive of assent except evidence, restricting the prudent calculation of consequences to the sphere of action, and yet the whole point of it in its context is plainly that in deciding whether to accept or reject Christianity prudential considerations are of the highest moment. The second so far conflicts with the stress which the first lays on evidence, as to allow the interpretation that the 'practice of religion' is rational so long as its doctrines are seen to be not simply incredible.

I think that the inconsistencies here, and the obscurity of the section from the Introduction which we have been discussing, arise from this: Butler is always assimilating, but not absolutely identifying, the acknowledgment of religion to 'practice', to behaving in certain ways; slurring over, but not quite obliterating, the fact that logically prior to religious practices is the assent to propositions which determine the nature of those practices, saying prayers, for instance, presupposing the belief that there is a God who hears prayers.

If, therefore, these questions: 'What is to be *done*?', 'What is to be *believed*?' are put separately to Butler, then according to him, 'What appears unlikely to be for one's happiness,' can never be the right answer to the first; nor 'What appears unlikely to be true', the right answer to the second. When, however, he is dealing with the motives for the acknowledgment of religion he asks the two questions in one breath and so answers the second one equivocally. Remembering the propositional element in religion, he holds the religious assent to be at least directed by probability; forgetting it, and thinking of religion simply as 'practice', he sometimes speaks as though probability could be disregarded for other considerations.

Straightening out the inconsistencies in Butler's grammar of assent, evidence is the principal though not the only proper deter-

minant of belief. The proscription of other motives as 'prejudice' is an isolated deviation from his usual view-point. And amongst the other motives he recognizes, not only interest, but also the disinterested obligations that would arise if certain circumstances were the case (for example, all that would be due from creature to Creator if there were a Creator) as properly disposing to the belief that they are the case (Pt. II, ch. vi, p. 386). It needs to be remembered too, that Butler thinks prudence is a duty; he thinks that every man ought to look for his own total happiness. Consequently, a conflict of interest and respect for the appearance of truth, is a conflict of duty with duty, not of duty merely with inclination.

There are three situations involving the adjustment of evidential and non-evidential factors: (1) Where assent is favoured by probability and by considerations other than evidence. (2) Where assent is favoured by considerations other than evidence but the propositions in question appear no more probable than their contradictories. (3) Where assent is favoured by considerations other than the evidence but the propositions in question appear less probable than their contradictories.

On (1) Butler's opinion is certainly that where our happiness may depend on our attitude to what must in practice be believed or disbelieved, and it seems to us more likely to be true than not, and when great obligations would remain unfulfilled if it were true and we believed it false, then not to believe is most culpable imprudence. There is a prudential obligation to assent.

On (2) his opinion, on the whole, seems to be that in the case of propositions of such great consequence, if their truth appears as 'supposable and credible' as their falsity, and to refuse assent to them is to act as if they were false, other motives than evidence should (or at any rate may) tip the balance of equi-probability. There is a prudential obligation (or at least, permission) to assent.¹

On (3) Butler does not express himself clearly because of his failure to analyse explicitly the notion of 'the practice of religion'. But his unambiguous statements on (1) entail that there is neither obligation nor permission, that no one has a duty or a right, to assent on any motives to any propositions which are intellectually judged to be probably untrue. At the same time, Butler is emphatic that anyone who regards the doctrines of religion as probably untrue,

¹ It makes this opinion psychologically more acceptable to realize, that when motives other than evidence bear on the decision to give or refuse assent to what appears on the evidence as likely as not, it will rarely happen that there is the steady judgment that the probability is even. It would be a most violent act of will that could dictate acceptance or rejection under those conditions. In such a conflict of evidence, what nearly always happens is that the needle of judgment is not lying steady on the mark of equi-probability, but continually flickering from positive to negative.

but still has his doubts, ought to act as if they may be true, i.e. he should try and find out if they are true and should carefully avoid what they condemn (Pt. II, ch. vi, p. 286).

The apologetic significance of the *Analogy*, on Butler's casuistry, is then: If the negative argument is successful, by removing the grounds for disbelief, it lets any positive presumption of the truth of religion assume sufficient weight to dictate assent. If the negative and positive arguments between them, can do no more than show that the truth of religion is as probable as its falsity, this is sufficient to authorize the 'infinite importance of the thing', perhaps to dictate assent, certainly to allow it. At the very least, it is proved that religion cannot be known to be false, and even this will impose on anyone who admits as much the obligation to act as if it may be true.

MR WOODRUFF'S ACTON

MAURICE COWLING

BEFORE one can understand the writings of a man now dead, in such a way as to be able to explain what he was trying to say when he wrote them, one has to master that personal progress of his mind which distinguished it and him from his contemporaries. One has to see him at once related to and separated from his world. At a later stage it may be possible to consider these utterances in abstraction from these personal and public situations; it may be possible to consider the ideas the writer was trying to express independently of the context of circumstance. But before that point can be reached, the understanding of circumstance is essential: we must detect the way in which his intellectual environment impinged upon the writer's personal consciousness, and we must observe how the writer reacted to it. Moreover, this does not disclose itself from a knowledge merely of his general relation to his society. One has to know it as it is revealed in his own most intimate writings, in his letters, in his diaries and in such other personal relics as may survive from one age to another. These and these only may be expected to reveal the extent to which he was hindered or helped in what he had to say by the conditions, intellectual and social, in which he lived. And from a study of them we may hope to be able to distinguish what he thought from what he said.

The condition of Acton studies at present (fifty years after his death) is such that, although most of his essays and lectures are reasonably accessible, comparatively little has come to light about the workings of the mind which produced them. Acton was a writer who in his published works reveals remarkably little of the movement of his mind. He was not a reflective writer, and over very large areas he offers only conclusions. The essays and lectures themselves give us little information about the process which produced these conclusions, and only a fragmentary indication into their grounds. And frequently we are left in doubt even about the intended application of the conclusions: sometimes they are tied to particular situations, but more often we are left wondering whether his intention was to apply them to all situations or to none.

Nor can it be said that the three volumes of Acton's correspondence which have already been published do much to remedy this defect in our knowledge. Herbert Paul's volume covers only a short, and that the least productive, period of Acton's life. Figgis and Vere Laurence's unfinished collection is really an anthology selected

with any end in view but the elucidation of the development of Acton's mind. And Cardinal Gasquet's volume, which covers the ground now covered by Mr Woodruff's Introduction, is a hopelessly corrupt, misleading and useless volume, which professes to be, but in fact certainly is not, a work of scholarship.

Since the possibility of coming to know *exactly* what Acton was attempting to say in his published writings depends very largely upon the meticulousness with which one is able to relate these writings to his own mental situations, one will, for the present, necessarily judge any Acton volume by the success with which (if it professes to be an exposition of his thinking) it reveals the underlying circumstance of his writings, or by the care with which (if it is a collection of his private or public writings) it reproduces in the greatest detail those contemporary and personal hints which reveal the local reference, the circumstantial meaning, the tone and flavour of each essay or letter; reveal, that is to say, what would be apparent to himself as he wrote or to a knowledgeable contemporary as he read them. The scholar needs, at present, to immerse himself in almost endless detail. And until he has done this, and until in particular he has had access to the whole body of Acton's letters and has studied the thousands of pages of notes which Acton left to the University Library in Cambridge, he will be able to say very little that is significant about the development of Acton's mind; and every general statement he may make will remain a mere guess, to be converted into a conclusion only when he is able to understand each letter and each essay as the product of a single mind at rest and in motion. Nothing, therefore, can be less helpful at this stage than the selective editing of his writings.

The thirteen essays and about seventy shorter extracts from essays published in this volume¹ have never been reprinted in England since they appeared originally in the various Catholic reviews — *The Rambler*, *The Chronicle*, *The North British Review* and *The Home and Foreign Review* — in the management of which Acton was the predominant force between 1858 and 1871. And Mr Woodruff is to be thanked for bringing them together in a readable volume as well as for making, in his Introduction, what turns out to be an unsuccessful attempt to give a fair and frank account of the negotiations undertaken by Acton with Newman, Simpson and with the Catholic hierarchy about the subjects which might legitimately be discussed in these reviews. For he is unsuccessful in that the manner in which he has edited the essays, occasionally altering or omitting phrases and frequently mistranscribing words, makes it difficult to regard this edition as either accurate in detail or reliable in the general im-

¹ LORD ACTON: *Essays on Church and State*, ed. Douglas Woodruff, Hollis and Carter.

pression it gives of certain aspects of Acton's thinking in this period.

The value of the Introduction is qualified by being based largely upon the Newman-Acton letters kept at the Oratory in Edgbaston. Mr Woodruff does not appear to realize that these letters tell a story somewhat different from the story which emerges from Acton's correspondence with Simpson, his co-editor. At the Oratory is to be found what Acton said to Newman about Simpson; at Downside, what he said, not always very flatteringly, to Simpson about Newman. Clearly these two sets of documents must be read together; no historian would suppose that the true situation is to be found in either without the other. But Mr Woodruff, whose general narration is doubtless supported also by the large collection of Acton's letters which he has in his possession, but which few scholars have seen, seems to have pursued the dangerous course of basing his interpretation upon the Oratory collection alone. There are at least two hundred of Acton's letters at Downside; it is difficult to understand how anything in Mr Woodruff's collection could entirely destroy their importance. Yet Mr Woodruff seems either to have made little use of them or to attach no importance to them.

The edition itself is useless to the student and will be misleading to other readers. It does not faithfully reproduce what Acton wrote and the cumulative effect of the alterations is to remove from Acton's words much of their bite and sting, especially with regard to matters which relate to the historical definition of Roman Catholic doctrine. There is certainly no softening of Acton's condemnation of what he conceived to be the *political* immorality of certain Popes, but one feels that the editor must have experienced a certain tenderness when confronted with Acton's historical, dogmatic certainty on matters of *doctrine*. And the omission of some of these dogmatic passages, as well as of certain passages relating to the Régale controversy in seventeenth-century France, makes it extremely difficult to understand why the Catholic hierarchy in England was so unsympathetic to Acton's attempts to bring to the notice of English Catholics the methods and the results of German historical scholarship. The tendency of Mr Woodruff's alterations is to reduce Acton's doctrinal errancy and offensiveness, and this places the burden of unreasonable intolerance upon the hierarchy which endeavoured to suppress his *Reviews*. One of the reasons for this intolerance was Acton's insistence upon the prevalence of Jansenism in the history of the Church. And in removing many of these Jansenistic references, Mr Woodruff has removed from one's picture of the young Acton a characteristic element of arrogance and enthusiasm: and it is an important element which cannot be neglected if one wishes to understand him as he actually was.

There are, broadly speaking, four sorts of deviation from the

original text. There are, first of all, understandable omissions of passages which refer to the books Acton was reviewing as the occasion for writing essays about, on p. 230, 'Bossuet', and on p. 251, 'Sarpi'.

Secondly, there are numerous errors of transcription throughout the whole book. Omitting the essays on 'Ultramontanism' and on 'Bossuet', to which I shall devote special attention, one finds on 1. 6 of p. 473, '1868' printed instead of '1858', on p. 258 1. 13 '1707' is printed instead of '1607'. 'Safe' in line 11 of p. 252 should be 'safer'. 'Spalatre' six lines from the bottom of the same page was 'Spalatro'. The sentence nine lines from the bottom of p. 250 contains 'resoration of Papal power' instead of Acton's 'renovation of the Papal power'. On p. 283, 1. 8 'State' should be 'state'. On p. 285, 1. 9 'states' should be 'state'. On p. 455, six lines from the bottom, 'our historians' should be 'our professional historians' and twelve lines above this 'still remote' was originally 'still more remote'. On p. 259, nine lines from the bottom 'the concealment of others' has been altered from 'the concealment of the others'. In 1. 6 of p. 254 'traditions' should be 'tradition'. And there is more to which it would be tedious to refer.

Thirdly there is one omission which seems to fall into a class of its own. On p. 451 the extract on 'Aristocracy' appears, as Mr Woodruff reproduces it, to be an abstract statement about the character of aristocracy, though it was in fact designed to refer, as the sentence next after the end of the extract indicates, to the aristocracy in which Acton lived. The sentence is 'Ours is still in the first age'. And, being concrete, it might be better not omitted.

Finally, and by far the most numerous of the deviations from the original text, there is a large body of omissions and alterations of which it may be said that some are the result of attempts to omit passages which might weary modern readers and that some are the result of careless copying, but all of which together combine to alter the flavour of Acton's words in a manner which may be thought to be in some way consistent. And because this is a short review I shall indicate only those deviations which affect the general picture. A comparison with the original texts will reveal many more deviations and many more errors than I shall have space to mention. A small number of them occurs outside the essays on 'Ultramontanism' and on 'Bossuet'. Acton's remark that Cardinal Manning's 'introductory sketch of the *Relations of England to Christianity* may perhaps have some rhetorical value; viewed as criticism it is unimportant', has a different ring when we are offered 'theoretical' in place of 'rhetorical' on p. 450 of Mr Woodruff's edition. And where in certain cases Acton wrote 'Churches', 'churches' or 'church', Mr Woodruff has often, as on pp. 248, 254 and 233, written 'Church' and

so given greater definiteness than the original warrants. He has also altered footnote 1 on p. 89 'ad Ecclesias urbis Romae' in a passage referring to the fourth century to 'ad Ecclesiam urbis Romae'. And 'papal' has frequently become, as on p. 46, 'Papal'. But the body of these alterations falls within these two essays and in order to give some idea of their general scale, I shall indicate the points at which they have been made and shall remark upon their character.

The original of the first sentence of 'Ultramontanism' is: 'Knowledge is treated by the Christian Church not merely as a means, but much more as an end, because it is the only *sphere* in which her progress is unwavering and subject to no relapse'. In Mr Woodruff's text 'sphere' has become 'atmosphere'. In l. 22 of p. 38 in the passage of the original 'It [the growth in knowledge] is earned by exertion; it is not simply given, *like* faith itself', 'like' has become 'by'. In l. 6 p. 39 'He confesses himself inferior to *the cause*' has replaced 'He confesses himself inferior to *his cause*'. In l. 28 'test' has become 'text'. At l. 10 of p. 48, an omission is made without any omission marks to give indication of it. From the sentence of the original text, 'Men suspected that it [scientific method] was altogether inadequate to give certain demonstration of the truths with which it is conversant and *that human reason was incompetent to gain such certitude* without the aid of external authority', the passage italicized has been omitted. And similarly six lines later, the passage in italic has been omitted from the sentence, 'Lamennais, the author of this new philosophy, taught that no evidence amounts to certain demonstration unless confirmed by the universal consent of *mankind*: *that the individual has no other test of truth than the general testimony*; and that the organ of this universal reason is *the authority* of the Holy See' and there are no marks to indicate these omissions.

On p. 66, l. 16 in the sentence: 'Among its [the Ultramontane Movement's] leaders there were men of great virtues and talents and at least one man of genius; but there is not one to whom *religious or secular learning* is really indebted', the italicized words have been omitted. Three lines later 'entirely' was once 'easily'. l. 20 of p. 67 has an omission (here in italic) in: 'Its [the Mediaeval Revival's] study was not of death but of life — not of a world of ruins but of that which is *the foundation* of our own'. And in none of these cases is any sign of omission made.

The last two lines of p. 80 omit a significant passage in a quotation from Döllinger. In the sentence, ' 'Blind obedience is neither exacted of the Christian nor conceded by him; *he must obey with his eyes open: he must attentively examine whatever is required of him*; and he must reject it as soon as he discerns, or believes that he discerns something sinful in it" ', the italicized passage has been omitted and the omission has the effect of altering the whole meaning

of the sentence by altering the reference of 'it'. Four lines from the bottom of p. 82 'temporal opinion' should be 'temporary opinion' and that sentence, again without indication, lacks the passage which is here italicized. 'A kind of amalgam between the eternal faith and temporary opinion is thus in constant process of generation, and by it Christians explain to themselves the bearings of their religion on *profane matters and of profane matters on religion*, so far as their knowledge allows.' And finally at line 29 of p. 84 the words 'politics, of' have been omitted from Acton's, 'In all these subjects the Ultramontane discovers a point pre-eminently Catholic, but also pre-eminently intellectual and true. He finds that there is a system of *politics, of metaphysics, and of ethics* singularly agreeable to Catholicism but entirely independent of it.'

Mr Woodruff has omitted the first three pages of Acton's essay on Bossuet for the good reason that it is largely a book review. But there seems to be no good reason for failing to indicate the omission. Similarly at l. 15 the sentence, 'That must be a very narrow understanding indeed which can suffer a disagreement in opinions to prevent an admission of Bossuet's astonishing powers', is omitted without indication. On p. 232 at l. 11, in a sentence in which Acton is sketching the background to the Régale controversy in France, 'But in Church fiefs every time the holder of a benefice died or vacated it, an interval elapsed *before the nomination of his successor*, during which period, on the principles of the very tenure itself, it was maintained that the revenues belonged to the sovereign', the passage italicized has been silently omitted by Mr Woodruff, the word 'Church' inserted before the word 'benefice', and a radical and significant alteration thus effected.

From p. 233 onwards Mr Woodruff has made very large omissions which have the effect both of relieving the reader from understanding the complexity of French ecclesiastical politics between 1673 and 1682 and also from being aware that Acton believed that Innocent XI had a high opinion of certain Jansenist Bishops and priests in France.

On p. 233, l. 11 the three dots after the sentence, 'Two only refused to acquiesce . . .' cover an omission of three-quarters of a *Rambler* page and include such sentences as that 'the state of ecclesiastical parties in France at this time was peculiar. The King's confessor, the celebrated Jesuit Père de la Chaise, with other Jesuits, was among the most strenuous upholders of the edict against which the two Bishops protested, animated by the desire to strike the two Bishops personally, as men to a certain extent Jansenistic in their theology, although held in high esteem by the Pope, Innocent XI'. The three dots following the sentence, 'Innocent in the meantime had begun to remonstrate with Louis . . .', cover the omission of

the three words 'with increasing energy', whilst the complete page which has been omitted after that sentence is not indicated in any way.

The sentence which begins at l. 15 of Mr Woodruff's p. 233 does not really exist in the original text. The first half of it, 'In December 1679 the Pope issued a third brief to the King, in which he threatened him with excommunication if he did not respect the rights of the Gallican Church . . .' would be accurate if Acton had not written 'the rights of the churches' instead of the 'rights of the Gallican Church'. But the second half of Mr Woodruff's sentence: 'which concluded its work in 1682, and which was unquestionably one of the most momentous demonstrations of ecclesiastical opinion which modern times have witnessed', occurs after two pages which have been completely omitted without sign, and refers to the 'celebrated assembly of the Gallican Church' convoked in 1682.

For a quarter of a page after this sentence, Mr Woodruff reprints Lord Acton's text, but thirteen lines from the bottom of p. 233 finds it necessary to omit another half page which among other things contains the following passage. ' . . . The complication of parties was indeed sufficient to tax the powers of the most accomplished diplomatists. On the side of the King were ranged nearly the whole of the French episcopate, the Jesuits attached to the court, and Cardinal D'Estrées; while the most zealous supporters of the Pope had been found among men charged with holding a Jansenistic theology . . .'

After 'a rap on the knuckles' at l. 7 on p. 234, half a page of text is omitted in which Acton describes with some liveliness Innocent's reply to the Bishops' Assembly proposals, the contents of which reply were 'marked with a vivacity and a tone of something like satire not often found in a pontifical document'. Three lines from the bottom of this page, in the 'Declaration of the Clergy of France', 'alone' should be 'only'.

On p. 236 the omission indicated thirteen lines from the bottom reads 'Jesuits, Jansenists, Parliament-men, found themselves con-

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flicting in new and strange combinations. The Pope had already desired the General of the Jesuits to command his French subjects to publish the brief on the *régale* which we have before described; the Jesuits of the royal party called in the aid of a friendly coercion on the part of the secular power to make it impossible for them to obey the mandate'. And one of the passages in the omission four lines later is a letter of Bossuet: ' "The affairs of the church" he said "are going on very ill. The Pope threatens us with tremendous constitutions and even, it is said, with new *formularies*. A good intention with little enlightenment is a serious evil in high places", as well as Acton's deliberate comment that, 'The author of the *Introduction* before us' [who was in fact the Abbé Guettée whose *Histoire de l'Eglise de France* had been condemned in Rome in 1852] '... entirely agrees with Bossuet in these expressions; and we think it important to call the attention of English readers to circumstances of this kind, as important elements in any judgment respecting the opinions of the French clergy

Between p. 237 and p. 239 a large number of important passages is omitted, including at l. 3 on the latter page, without signs of omission, the italicized portion of: 'His [Bossuet's] learning might have been as great, his character might have been the same; but the great fact before his eyes would have been *the living Pope in the Vatican; and not the living King at St Germain*. *The ecclesiastical world would have been* as prominent in his view at Rome as the political world was to him in France'. And after omitting on p. 239 at l. 15 a passage in which French Protestants are described as 'refusing to take their religious creed from him [Louis XIV] who had as yet found none to disobey his slightest serious command . . .' and various other passages, Mr Woodruff omits at l. 24 on p. 241 a long passage describing the nature and indicating the prevalence of Quietism in the history of the Church.

From p. 242 to p. 245, which constitute the last four pages of this version of this essay, there are omissions in all amounting to about sixteen pages; and although half of this is merely quotation from Le Dieu's account of Bossuet's personal habits, the remaining half contains accounts of the influence of Madame Guyon, who is described as one 'whom Bossuet treated with much delicacy and considerateness — regarding her as a crack-brained devotee rather than as a heretic . . .', and of the Papal condemnation of Fénélon's *Explications des Maximes des Saints sur la Vie Interieure*.

On p. 244 at l. 18 Mr Woodruff has omitted a contentious passage about Papal Infallibility as well as a paragraph in which Acton describes the nature of the equivocal submission made by the Port-Royalists to the condemnation of their five propositions. Finally, on p. 245 at l. 13, in a paragraph referring to Quesnel's *Réflexions Morales*,



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'a book which was warmly received by the French episcopate and defended by Bossuet's own pen' is omitted and there is nothing to show that an omission has been made. In the last four pages, and indeed throughout the essay, the effect of Mr Woodruff's omissions has been to detach nearly all of Acton's remarks from their historical contexts.

Enough has been said to make it clear that this is in no way adequate as a work of scholarship. And it must, in all fairness, be added that its editor does not altogether pretend that it is one. He reprints these essays not for their value to historians but for their 'relevance for the twentieth century' which 'comes from his [Acton's] prophetic pre-occupation with the very questions with which the twentieth century has found itself pre-occupied . . . the moral ends of government, the relation of politics to morality . . .' (p. 6 of the Introduction). And however unhappy one may feel about 'prophetic' pre-occupations, one must, to some extent, treat the volume as an anthology raising political questions rather than as material for an historical study of Acton himself.

But with whatever willingness this may be admitted, it remains true that Messrs Hollis and Carter's proposal, announced on the dust cover of this book, to publish four or five further Acton volumes will have the effect of giving their edition the appearance of being definitive; and the only conclusion that may be drawn from a critical study of the volume now before us is that, unless in these later volumes greater care is taken to publish exactly what Acton wrote, the Acton whom this generation will leave to be destroyed by future generations of scholars will be a pontifical, emasculated bore, not the offensive, coat-trailing young man he was, whose character demanded conflict and who was eventually undermined both as an historian and as a person because he could not withstand the shock of conflict once he had engaged in it.